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SUMMARY 
 
 
Collective bargaining is the process whereby employees act as a collective unit whilst 
negotiating terms and conditions of employment with employers.  The collective unit 
typically takes the form of a trade union, mandated by its members to negotiate on 
their behalf.  By negotiating collectively the inherent imbalance of power between 
employer and individual employee is seen to be neutralised. 
 
The process of collective bargaining enjoys legal status in South Africa and around 
the world.  The Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924 institutionalised collective 
bargaining for the first time in the form of the Industrial-Council system.  This sectoral 
bargaining system stood firm throughout the pre-democracy period but initially 
excluded non-white employees.  Industrial unrest in the 1970s was the catalyst for 
the Wiehan commission which ultimately brought all employees into the fold.  
 
By the dawn of democracy in South Africa the bargaining system enjoyed wide-
spread support and legitimacy. This was particularly so amongst the COSATU-led 
labour movement which enjoyed a position of political strength. This support and 
strength were reflected in the contents of both the Labour Relations Act and the 
Constitution which enshrined the constitutional right to engage in collective 
bargaining.   
 
Possibly the most debated aspect of the Council system has been the question of 
extending agreements to non-parties.  Those in favour argue that the Council system 
cannot function in the absence of extensions.  This is so because what would then 
effectively be a voluntary system would not attract sufficient volunteers.  Those 
against argue that extensions act as a barrier to economic activity, particularly for 
small and new businesses.   
 
Legislation has, since 1924, facilitated the extension of agreements as long as 
certain criteria are met.  Section 32 of the Labour Relations Act is the current 
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extension vehicle.  The extension criteria have vacillated over time and especially so 
in recent history with section 32 being subject to change in every post-democracy 
amendment to the Act. 
 
Possibly the most serious challenge to the extension status quo has come in the form 
of a constitutional challenge by the Free-Market Foundation.  The Foundation 
advances old economic arguments but links these to an alleged impingement of 
constitutional rights.  The challenge comes at a time when the country is 
experiencing the most significant socio-political turbulence since democracy.  This 
includes the most enduring strike in our history, a landmark-employer lock-out and a 
parliamentary facelift.  
 
The Metal and Engineering Industries Bargaining Council oversees the biggest 
manufacturing sector in the South African economy.  This status prompted the 
Council to submit its own responding papers in the Free-Market case.  Particularly 
fascinating is that an employer party to the Council not only supports the Foundation 
case but has also lodged its own proceedings against the extension of the 2014 
Engineering agreement.  Both these cases are still pending and the outcomes have 
the potential to transform the political and economic landscape of our country.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
This dissertation examines arguments for and against the legislated extension of 
collective agreements and in particular whether they hold constitutional muster. The 
examination is based primarily on papers before the Gauteng High Court in the 
matter between the Freemarket Foundation and the Minister of Labour (1st 
respondent), the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development (2nd respondent) 
and numerous registered bargaining councils (3rd to further respondents).   
 
Particular focus is placed on the responding papers of the Metal and Engineering 
Industry Bargaining Council. This Council is the only one of the Council respondents 
to have submitted an individual response to the application. It is also the largest and 
most influential Council within our manufacturing sector and has been the subject of 
recent developments which render it an intriguingly relevant case study. Their 2014 
collective agreement which followed a four-week industry-wide strike has not yet 
been extended. This is a consequence of a pending legal challenge from one of the 
employer parties to the Council. 
 
An initial foundation to the treatise is established by outlining the concept and history 
of collective bargaining, including a history of agreement extension in South Africa. 
This is a logical starting point given the inherent socio-political context of the subject 
matter.  It would indeed be improper to conduct this examination without first 
formulating a thorough understanding of the origins of collective bargaining, both 
nationally and internationally.  
 
The national origins are of particular relevance, given South Africa’s unique political 
history and the role of the labour movement therein.  The movement has, however, 
been forced to revisit this role post-democracy in the RSA. This is a consequence of 
the political alliance forged with the African National Congress. This changing 
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dynamic has played out within the context of a developing nation formulating policy 
responses to factors such as globalisation and economic recession.  The impact of 
these factors is addressed by both parties in their respective arguments.  
 
Attention is also given to the legal framework of collective bargaining. This sheds 
light on the specific question of constitutionality and also begs the question whether 
the courts are in fact the correct forum to adjudicate this issue.  
 
The focus is then narrowed to those sections of the Labour Relations Act which 
govern the operations of bargaining councils and in particular the extension of 
agreements. This includes the proposed amendments thereto. 
 
An analysis of the Freemarket Foundation application follows. The argument has 
both a legal and economic rationale.  The legal argument tests the constitutionality of 
extensions on various fronts. There are two primary arguments. The first is that 
bargaining councils are “private actors” and as such should not be afforded the 
authority to impose their agreements on non-parties. The second is that current 
legislation governing extensions violates the principle of majoritarianism. 
 
The economic argument is founded on the allegation that agreement extensions 
retard economic growth and employment with an especially negative impact on small 
business and the unemployed. It is alleged further that the system effectively 
amounts to collusion between big business and organised labour so as to protect 
their respective interests at the expense of fringe players and society as a whole.    
 
The Metal and Engineering Bargaining Council submission stands juxtaposed - 
defending the status quo. The Foundation’s economic arguments are refuted, 
primarily on the basis of a lack of evidence. The Council leans heavily on the 
exemption system as evidence of sufficient flexibility. It is also pointed out that 
affected parties have access to the courts to address any grievances.  
 
The Council strongly advocates the purported social benefits arising from a system 
that enjoys political legitimacy within a democratic framework. Having reference to 
the objectives of the Labour Relations Act it is suggested that, should there be any 
3 
constitutional violation, this can be justified in terms of section thirty-six of the 
Constitution. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE CONCEPT AND HISTORY OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
 
 
 
2.1 THE CONCEPT OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
 
Collective bargaining involves employees negotiating with employers as a collective 
rather than as individuals. Grogan identifies this as the defining characteristic of 
collective bargaining, noting that it involves negotiations between parties 
representing groups of individuals.1Grogan goes on to refer to collective bargaining 
as “a process by which employers and organised groups of employees seek to 
reconcile their conflicting interests and goals through mutual accommodation”. 2  
Whilst employers may prefer to negotiate contracts individually, employees are able 
to attain greater bargaining power through collective action.  This collective is 
achieved through trade-union organisation which is the foundation upon which 
collective bargaining is built.3 
 
Employees, represented by their trade union, may act as a collective in terms of their 
employment with the same employer or as a collective in terms of their employment 
in the same industry.  The process where the collective engages with a singular 
employer is called plant-level bargaining.4  Engagement with multiple employers on a 
sectoral level is referred to as centralised bargaining.5 
 
Grogan identifies the process of “bargaining” as the second defining characteristic. 
This process has been distinguished from consultation in that the latter does not 
                                                          
1 Grogan Collective Labour Law 8. 
2 Grogan Collective Labour Law 86. 
3 Godfrey, Maree, Du Toit and Theron Collective Bargaining in South Africa (2010) 11 
(hereinafter referred to as “Collective Bargaining”). 
4 Grogan Collective Labour Law 8. 
5 Ibid. 
5 
contain any element of agreement.  The distinction between the two was drawn by a 
member of the old Industrial Court in the case of MAWU v Hart 6 as follows: 
 
“To consult means to take counsel or seek information or advice from someone and 
does not imply any kind of agreement, whereas to bargain means to haggle or 
wrangle so as to arrive at some agreement on terms of give and take. The term 
negotiate is akin to bargaining and means to confer with a view to compromise and 
agreement.” 
 
The process of “bargaining” therefore involves an element of compromise from both 
sides.  This implies a shift from the natural balance of power that stems from an 
employer’s capacity to provide (or destroy) livelihoods.7  This shift in power towards 
equilibrium is achieved by arming employees with the right to withhold their labour in 
pursuit of their demands.  This right, along with employers’ recourse to lock-out, is 
described by Grogan as the “fuel for collective bargaining”.8  This is because the 
execution of these rights has the consequence of collateral damage to both parties 
and in this way serves as a catalyst for compromise. 
 
As an actual process collective bargaining can be triggered by a number of events.  
This can be upon the expiry of an existing agreement, or when existing conditions 
are no longer satisfactory or as a means to resolve any new dispute or grievance.9 
 
2.1.1 DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT 
 
The concept of collective bargaining emerged with the advent of a minority of skilled 
or “craft worker” unions during the nineteenth century.  Faced with initial capitalist 
government efforts to discourage labour collectives unions managed to achieve wide-
spread recognition over time. The scarce skills they possessed as a collective 
enabled them to engage in meaningful negotiations with employers.  In South Africa 
the first trade unions can be traced back to the skilled printers who produced our first 
newspapers.10  The discovery of gold and diamonds in the latter half of the 19th 
century caused the influx of engineers and skilled artisans, mainly from the United 
                                                          
6 (1985) 6 ILJ 478 (IC). 
7 Grogan Collective Labour Law 9. 
8 Grogan Collective Labour Law 12. 
9 Nel South African Employment Relations: Theory and Practice 4th ed (2002) 135. 
10 Nel South African Employment Relations: Theory and Practice 36. 
6 
Kingdom.  They brought with them not only their skills but their close ties to trade 
unionism.11  It is important to emphasise that the membership of these trade unions 
were actively restricted for purposes of protecting against the dilution of the skills 
base.  This strategy was aimed at protecting the living standards of the skilled 
artisans.  Africans specifically, were viewed as a potential threat because they were 
seen as cheap labour which could be used by employers to undercut their higher 
wages.  
 
2.1.2 THE SOCIO-POLITICAL CONTEXT 
 
However, the social significance of collective bargaining was truly felt only after the 
growth of unions that also represented the mass of unskilled workers.  This 
development in the constituency of trade unions to higher proportions of unskilled 
labourers was largely a consequence of a parallel transition from “manufacture” to 
“machinofacture”.  This latter term was coined by Marx to describe the progressive 
introduction of machinery into the production process which tended to dilute the 
significance of the traditional craftsmen.12  This was because of the sheer numbers of 
persons involved and because of the reduced capacity of unskilled workers to lever 
higher standard of living with the tool of wage-bargaining alone.  Instead the tool box 
was expanded to include access to social benefits and political rights.  In this way the 
labour movements became entrenched within the political arena as well.13 
 
In this way the institutions of collective bargaining became inextricably entwined 
within the socio-political framework of society.  This has the consequence that these 
institutions cannot be divorced from the structures of political and social power 
around them.  A clear example in South Africa’s early history was the formation of the 
South African Labour Party which drew the majority of its support from white trade 
union members.14  Kahn-Freund highlighted this insight noting that it is far simpler to 
transfer labour relations rules that relate to individuals from one country to another 
                                                          
11 Nel South African Employment Relations: Theory and Practice 37. 
12 Webster Cast in a Racial Mould: Labour Process and Trade Unionism in the Foundries (1985) 
40. 
13 Grogan Collective Labour Law 2. 
14 Nel South African Employment Relations: Theory and Practice 39. 
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than it is to transfer rules relating to collective issues.15  In South Africa for example 
the high level of racial heterogeneity would be a distinguishing feature from most 
European countries.  The presence of ex-slaves and indentured labourers of both 
Chinese and Asiatic origin has ensured a truly multicultural dynamic in South Africa.16 
 
Despite this political aspect resulting in cyclical fluctuations (in the fortunes of 
collective bargaining systems), the system has proved to be a resilient and enduring 
phenomenon.  This has been the case even in instances where the political 
dispensation of the times has seriously curtailed workers’ rights.17 
 
The process of collective bargaining is by nature an adversarial one that involves 
negotiation between parties with conflicting interests.  These parties, through this 
process, seek to achieve mutually acceptable compromises.18 
 
2.1.3 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND THE LAW 
 
Collective Bargaining as a concept and process is recognised and legitimized 
through labour law.  Kahn-Freund viewed the law as a secondary force in the 
industrial relations environment emphasizing the fundamental inequality between 
employer and employee.  He suggested that the law could do little to equalise this 
imbalance.19  Instead the law is viewed as a mechanism to protect the institutions of 
collective bargaining so as to ensure the roleplayers may engage on an equal footing 
notwithstanding this “natural” imbalance.20 
 
The courts have been inclined to refrain from direct involvement in the collective-
bargaining process itself. Instead the view is held that the roleplayers themselves are 
best positioned to shape the outcomes.  It was suggested in Delisle v Canada 
(Deputy Attorney General)21 that the courts should show “a degree of deference” 
                                                          
15 Bean Comparative Industrial Relations: An Introduction to Cross-National Perspectives (1985) 
5. 
16 Nel South African Employment Relations: Theory and Practice 37. 
17 Godfrey et al Collective Bargaining 1 
18 Ibid. 
19 Godfrey et al “Collective Bargaining 4.  
20 Ibid. 
21 [1999] 2 scr 989 par 126. 
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based on conscious recognition of the complexity and the balance sought to be 
struck by legislation among the interests of labour, management, and the public.  
 
This autonomy of the collective bargaining system has been viewed as a 
fundamental principle in legal systems around the globe, giving rise to classic 
concepts such as “collective laissez-faire” in Britain, “Tarifautonomie” in Germany 
and “L’autonomie collective” in France.22  It appears as though the democratic South 
African Government, notwithstanding its legislative duty to promote and encourage 
collective bargaining, has adopted a similar philosophy.  This is evident by the 
absence of any programmes to assist statutory and bargaining councils.23  Section 1 
of the LRA, which outlines the purpose of the Act, provides a further clue in support 
of this angle.  This is evidenced in the wording of “providing a framework” for 
collective bargaining which is indicative of a voluntarist approach where the rules 
rather than the outcome are dictated by Government.24  This “hands-off” approach by 
Government has, however, been tested in times of economic pressure and in 
particular as a consequence of globalisation.  A good example of state 
interventionism that pre-dates globalisation occurred during the economic depression 
of the 1930s which changed public opinion towards greater state intervention.  In 
fact, an underlying assumption of the New Deal was that the imbalance in power 
between employers and employees was not only the cause of labour unrest but also 
served to aggravate the economic conditions by reducing the spending power of 
workers.25 
 
2.1.4 INSTITUTIONALISED COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
 
The process of collective bargaining takes on an institutionalised form when it occurs 
within the scope of a country’s legal framework.  In South Africa this framework 
begins with the Constitution, where the right to bargain collectively has been 
entrenched and where it is stipulated that national legislation may be enacted to 
                                                          
22 Bruun “The Autonomy of Collective Agreement” in Blanpain (ed) Collective Bargaining, 
Discrimination, Social Security and European Integration (2003) 5. 
23 Godfrey et al Collective Bargaining 125. 
24 Grogan Collective Labour Law 7. 
25 Bean Comparative Industrial Relations: An Introduction to Cross-National Perspectives 106. 
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regulate collective bargaining.26   Typically such legislation would be designed to 
govern the manner in which the major industrial stakeholders, capital and labour, 
interact with each other on issues where there is mutual but conflicting interest.  The 
Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 is this enabling legislation in South Africa and has 
as one of its primary purposes the provision of a framework for employees and 
employers to bargain collectively.27 
 
It is at the sectoral level (rather than plant level) where governments have seen fit to 
facilitate formalised legal institutions through which the bargaining process can be 
properly managed.  In South Africa these institutions were initially known as industrial 
councils but in terms of current legislation are referred to as bargaining councils.28  
The primary objective behind the establishment of these industry councils is to 
secure a measure of stability and efficiency in key engine rooms of the country’s 
economy and includes dispute resolution.  This is a central objective of all modern 
industrial relations legislation.29  The establishment of bargaining councils is on a 
voluntary basis but once they have been formally registered these councils acquire 
regulatory functions in terms of the LRA.30  They also acquire a corporate identity in 
that they can sue and be sued.31 
 
In South Africa there is a forum of institutionalised engagement between the three 
major social partners that exists at a level higher than mere industry bargaining. This 
forum is known as NEDLAC and it serves as a platform for seeking consensus rather 
than a process of bargaining in its purest form. 
 
Trade unions are the conduit through which labour represents its interest at the 
council.  Whether at plant level or industry level, trade unions provide the solidarity 
and power to the voice of the individual employee.  This union power that is achieved 
as a balancing mechanism in response to the natural power of employers has an 
ironic and corollary impact on the other side of the labour equation.  This impact is 
                                                          
26 S 23(5) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996. 
27 S 1(c) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
28 This change in name was effected in terms of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
29 Grogan Collective Labour Law 85. 
30 Van der Walt, Le Roux and Govindjee Labour Law in Context (2012) 191. 
31 Grogan Collective Labour Law 74. 
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that employers, and more specifically smaller, less resourced employers, are driven 
to seek solidarity (and indeed a measure of security) in the face of union power and 
militancy.  This is achieved, in much the same way as by employees, by acting on a 
collective basis, and the vehicle through which this is achieved is known as an 
employer’s organisation. 
 
Employers’ organisations and trade unions are referred to as the “parties” to the 
industry councils. The first-mentioned represent capital’s interests and the other 
labour’s interests on the council. Both trade unions and employer organisations are 
statutory bodies themselves and are required to be registered in terms of the LRA.  
The current process of establishing a council in South Africa requires an application 
to the registrar by registered trade unions and employer organisations. 32   This 
application together with any objections, is assessed by NEDLAC and, if necessary, 
the Minister of Labour.  NEDLAC is empowered to decide on appropriate 
demarcation.  The primary criterion is the representivity of the parties within the 
specific demarcated area.  These demarcations occur along two major lines, namely 
the nature of the work or business and secondly, the geographic area of application.  
Together these two criteria form what is known as the scope of the council. 
 
In the case of some industries there is no geographic demarcation in that a national 
council determines terms and conditions of service for the entire country.33  In other 
industries geographically dislocated councils have the autonomy to determine 
different conditions of service within the same industry.34 
 
An application for registration of a council shall not receive consideration without the 
submission of a council constitution which conforms with section 30 of the LRA.35  
This statutory requirement is the means for ensuring the objective of good 
governance within councils and, by extension, the industry concerned.  The 
                                                          
32 In terms of s 29 of the LRA. 
33 The Metal and Engineering Industry is an example in South Africa where centralised 
negotiations determine conditions throughout the Republic of South Africa. There is 
decentralisation in terms of local councils but their role is to manage the affairs of the national 
council on a local level. 
34 An example of decentralised geographically determined councils within the same industry in 
South Africa is the furniture industry. 
35 Act 66 of 1995. 
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constitution must include matters such as the appointment of party representatives 
and council officials, the procedure for handling disputes amongst parties and the 
financial management of the council. Importantly in the context of this treatise the 
constitution must provide for the representation of small and medium enterprises36 
and a procedure for exemption from collective agreements.37 
 
Even more importantly in the context of this dissertation is the concept of “non-
parties”.  This status can occur on two levels.  Firstly there are those employers and 
employees that are non-parties to the council in that the employers are not members 
of an employers’ organisation party to the council, or the employee is not a member 
of a trade union that is party to the council.  This status as a non-party to the council 
does not exclude the possibility of being a member of a trade union or employers’ 
organisation – only, it would not be a representative body that is a party to the 
council.  The second level of non-party status is being a non-party to a specific 
agreement.  It can happen, for example, that an employers’ organisation might be 
party to a bargaining council but is not a signatory to a specific agreement.  In this 
way any of the members of that employers’ organisation would be regarded as party 
employers in the context of the council but non-party employers in the context of any 
agreement.  This is an important concept to understand when examining the key 
thrust of this treatise which is the extension of agreements to non-parties. 
 
  
                                                          
36 S 30(1)(b). 
37 S 30(1)(k). 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE HISTORY OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
 
 
 
3.1 THE ADVENT OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
 
The term was first coined by British Labour-movement pioneer, Beatrice Webb, in 
1891 but the practice itself had become commonplace in European countries before 
this date.38  The concept of workers combining on a collective basis can be traced 
back as far as the 17th century with the advent of the Industrial Revolution.39  This 
was a consequence of a process of labour-law liberalisation in the Western World 
that had followed the initial resistance to unions in the earlier half of the nineteenth 
century.40  Unfortunately for the labour movement the progress that had occurred in 
Europe was not mirrored in the colonies over which Europe ruled.41  By the end of 
the First World War there were no laws in the Union of South Africa that sought to 
regulate organised labour.42  The Masters and servant Act of 1841 was the first 
legislation that was introduced to govern employer-worker relations but this was on a 
bilateral level and did not address issues of worker representation.43 
 
3.2 THE INDUSTRIAL CONCILIATION ACT OF 1924 
 
In South Africa collective bargaining has been officially recognised as an institution 
since 1924.44  This recognition came in the form of the Industrial Conciliation Act45 
which was largely a response to an armed uprising of white workers in 1922.  This 
was the first comprehensive piece of labour legislation in South Africa and its focus 
                                                          
38 Godfrey et al Collective Bargaining 1. 
39 Nel South African Employment Relations: Theory and Practice 133. 
40 Grogan Collective Labour Law 2. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Grogan Collective Labour Law 3. 
43 Nel South African Employment Relations: Theory and Practice 36. 
44 Godfrey et al Collective Bargaining 16. 
45 11 of 1924. 
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was on collective labour rights.46  Individual labour rights were covered in terms of 
the Wage Act which followed a year later.47 
 
The primary grievance of these white workers was a demand for protection against a 
perceived threat of cheap African labour.48  Though harshly dealt with, the white 
miners did succeed in achieving protection through the exclusion of Africans from the 
Industrial Council system.  This was achieved by excluding Africans from the 
definition of “employee” with a concomitant limitation on membership of trade unions 
to “employees”.49 
 
This structure of excluding blacks assisted in achieving the first of two political 
objectives of the Act.  This first of these objectives was to provide preferential 
employment opportunities for white workers as a means to address the “poor white” 
problem.50  The second political objective was to prop up General Smuts’ political 
base after it had been eroded significantly following the 1922 strikes.51 
 
The central objective of the 1924 Act from a frame-work point of view was to facilitate 
industrial self-governance.52  The mechanics to achieve this objective was a network 
of industry specific councils, comprised of employer and employee representatives.  
The thinking was that these parties to the council would be left to their own devices to 
resolve disputes within their scope of registration.53  A feature of the South African 
collective-bargaining landscape is that the system of councils has not been imposed 
upon the respective sectors.54  The exception to this is the national and provincial 
state departments.55 
 
                                                          
46 Grogan Collective Bargaining 3. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Godfrey et al Collective Bargaining 18. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Jones Collective Bargaining in South Africa 2nd ed (1985) 24. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Notice of Motion 19. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Van der Walt et al Labour Law in Context 188. 
55 Ibid. 
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One negative “side-affect” of the exclusion of Africans from the ambit of the 
legislation was that they could not be bound by the extension of council 
agreements. 56   This created a loophole and served to thwart the objective of 
preventing unfair competition on wages.  The legislature took steps to close this 
loophole during the following decade such that extensions became binding in respect 
of African employees.57 
 
3.3 DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH AFRICA FROM 1937 TO 1979 
 
In the amendments of 1937 an allowance was made for “pass-bearing” African 
workers to be overseen by a newly formed labour inspectorate.58  The 1947 Industrial 
(Natives) Act Bill was introduced by the United Party Government following a period 
of organisation of black labour in the 1940s.  This Bill, had it been enacted would 
have recognised African Unions even though they would still have been excluded 
from the Industrial Council system.  However, even this limited progress was blocked 
following the election of the Nationalist Government in 1948, which proceeded to 
scrap the bill.59  The allowances made in terms of the 1937 amendments also came 
to an end when legislation was amended such that Africans were again no longer 
classified as employees.60  The racial policies of the Nationalist Government were 
endorsed in terms of the Industrial Conciliation Act of 195661 and the Black Labour 
Relations Regulations Act of 1953.62 
 
It must be noted, however, that this only restricted black membership in registered 
trade unions and did not prevent the formation of unregistered black trade unions.63  
Such unregistered black unions were not illegal and did exist but had to operate 
outside of the Industrial Conciliations Act, and as such were unable to conclude 
legally enforceable industry agreements.64  Their existence was often fleeting and 
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they came under pressure from the Government in a number of ways. 65   This 
pressure was often aimed at its leaders by way of detention, gaol and banning 
orders. 66   As a consequence these unions struggled to build any worthwhile 
momentum, that is, until the Natal strikes of 1973 and the Soweto uprisings in 1976 
which proved to be a timely shot in the arm.67 
 
The economic growth following the 2nd world war was accompanied by a parallel 
evolution in the emergence of stable collective bargaining systems.68  This relative 
stability was, however, undermined with the increased integration of global markets 
post 1970.69  These markets, dominated by multinational corporations fundamentally 
transformed the labour-market landscape.70   This was because of the impact of 
collective agreements on the labour markets in times of growing international 
competition.71  The economic stakes for the national Government became too high to 
be left in the hands of private players alone.72  Instead, the strategy developed to one 
of seeking pacts with the respective social partners so as to create synergy between 
bargaining outcomes and Government policy.73 
 
The wave of mass strikes in Natal in 1973 involving 100 000 African and Indian 
workers was a direct cause for the formal establishment of MAWU in 
Pietermaritzburg in April of that year.74  This can be contrasted with a large strike by 
71 000 black workers on the mines in 1920 which was easily dealt with because 
there was no union organisation.  Strikers were also isolated from one another 
because of the compound system on the mines.75 
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3.4 THE WIEHAHN COMMISSION 
 
In much the same way that the Smuts Government of 1924 could not ignore the 
reality of the 1922 strikes the Nationalist Government was also forced into action.76  
The first step was the appointment of a commission headed by Professor Wiehahn 
which recommended labour-law reforms.  The most significant reform was the 
removal of the exclusion of black workers from the labour legislation.77 
 
A significant pre-democracy milestone for collective bargaining in South Africa was 
the Wiehahn Commission of Inquiry of 1979.  This inquiry was commissioned 
following strikes amongst black workers in the Durban area in 1973, followed by the 
emergence of new African trade unions.78  These developments were perceived as a 
threat to the existing industrial-relation system as well as white-minority rule itself.79  
The conclusion drawn by the commission was that racially segregated bargaining 
institutions were unsustainable and it was recommended that they be abolished.80  
The following amendment to the Labour Relations Act in 1981 established the first 
completely non-racial labour statute.81  This was achieved by virtue of the following 
new wide definition of “employee”: 
 
“Any person who is employed by, or working for, any employer, and receiving, or 
entitled to receive, any renumeration, and any other person whatsoever who in any 
manner assists in the carrying on or conducting of the business of an employer.”82 
 
In 1978, just prior to the changes following the Wiehahn report, there were 70 000 
black members of 27 unregistered unions.83  Four years later in 1982 there were 
579 000 black employees that were members of registered trade unions.84 
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This shift in the political and economic dynamics underpinning industrial councils 
from the 1970s did not undermine the significance of their pivotal role within the 
South African Labour Relations framework.  In fact, their numbers reached a high in 
1983 when there were 104 in operation.85  By 2004 the number of councils had 
declined significantly but the number of employees covered by councils had doubled.  
This apparent anomaly was caused by the advent, after 1995, of four large public-
sector bargaining councils.86  By 2012 approximately 20.3 percent of the total labour 
force in South Africa was covered by Bargaining Councils.87 
 
3.5 POST-APARTHEID 
 
This has been the case in post-apartheid South Africa, with the Department of 
Labour publishing five-year plans of action clarifying their priorities within the broader 
regulatory framework. 88   This partnership sentiment has been shared in Europe 
where a research report viewed collective bargaining and legislation as being 
complementary.89 
 
Halton Cheadle, in South Africa, views collective bargaining as a means to 
implement the “fair labour practices” as mandated by our primary source of 
legislation, namely the Constitution.90  Section 23(5) of the Constitution guarantees 
the right of trade unions and employers’ organisations to engage in collective 
bargaining.91  The fact that South Africa adopted a constitutional dispensation post 
1994 represented a significant shift in respect of the rights of its subjects.92  This was 
because subjects were no longer singularly dependent on the will of Parliament.  
Instead, the Constitution serves to protect rights by ensuring that legislation 
emanating from Parliament complies with said Constitution.93  It is important to note 
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that notwithstanding the constitutional entrenchment of the right to bargain there is no 
duty to bargain imposed on employers.94 
 
It was in fact the Interim Constitution95 which played an initial role in shaping the new 
labour legislation post-apartheid to the extent that it set out to comply with South 
Africa’s international law obligations.  This Constitution included the right to join and 
form trade unions, to bargain collectively and the right to strike.96  The fact that these 
labour rights were entrenched in the Constitution is indicative of the drafters’ 
intentions to avoid the abuse of unions that occurred under the old regime.97  The 
Interim Constitution became effective in April of 1994 and consequently influenced 
the ensuing debate on labour legislation which was high on Government agenda, 
given the role that the labour movement had played in dismantling apartheid.  It also 
helped that there had been a large scale movement of union leaders into party 
politics immediately after political transition.98 
 
The labour movement was headed by the trade-union federation COSATU99which 
formed an integral part of the tri-partite political alliance with the African National 
Congress and the South African Communist Party.  Their views on collective 
bargaining structures at the onset of democracy were set out at their Campaigns 
conference in 1994.100  The Congress had concrete views in this regard calling for 
centralised bargaining in specifically demarcated sectors on a co-ordinated basis 
which could involve the amalgamation of existing councils.  The strength of the views 
was illustrated in a call for legislation that would compel centralised bargaining.101 
 
This strong support for centralised collective bargaining by the trade union 
constituency from the 1990’s stood in contrast to previous feelings of distrust towards 
the council system.  This distrust emanated from the long-time exclusion of black 
workers from the council system and the prejudice they had suffered as a result.  
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This had the consequence that even after the post-Wiehahn reforms black trade 
unions continued to prioritise plant-level organisation.  However, by the late eighties 
the benefits of centralised collective bargaining had become clear to COSATU.  The 
African National Congress held similar views and specifically highlighted collective 
bargaining as an important component of their reconstruction and development 
programme (RDP).102 
 
COSATU’s research arm, NALEDI103 produced a discussion paper shortly after the 
conference wherein they expanded on COSATU’s centralised bargaining policy.  This 
paper supported the extension of agreements favouring a concept of “framework 
agreements”. 104   Such agreements set out only basic conditions of employment 
which left room for plant-level bargaining on issues that were not contained in the 
framework agreement.105  It was envisaged that such a system would be able to 
accommodate lesser-resourced enterprises and reduce the required number of 
exemption applications.106 
 
At the time of political transition Business South Africa (BSA) also offered their 
support for the underlying principles of the council system.  BSA also offered support 
for the extension of agreements albeit under certain conditions, most notably an 
effective exemption system.107 
 
3.6 THE IMPACT OF GLOBALISATION 
 
The spine of collective bargaining is trade unionism, and consequently any pressure 
exerted on this vital organ, impacts directly on the health of the collective institution.  
This section examines the impact of globalisation on both the spine and the “mother 
body”.  The term “globalisation” has been defined by a number of authors.  
Tomlinson described it as a complex connectivity in which there is “the rapidly 
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developing and ever-densening network of interconnections and interdependencies 
that characterises modern social life”.108 
 
The collapse of the apartheid regime ended the politically motivated economic 
sanctions imposed on South Africa.  This process opened the country up to a whole 
new world of globalisation. Whilst these developments would undoubtedly have 
resulted in significant social improvements for workers in South Africa it did bring with 
it some stern challenges for the trade-union movement.109  Arguably the biggest of 
these were the response and plans required from local employers in order to 
compete in the global economy.  These plans often included investment in new 
technology, flexible work practices as well as a reduced demand for labour.110  These 
factors contributed to unemployment rates which impacted negatively on trade-union 
membership.  500 000 jobs were lost in South Africa between the period 1994 and 
2000.111  Even though the economic growth rate increased in the period until 2007 
this did not serve to make any serious dent on the high unemployment levels in the 
country.112  The challenges faced by employers when re-entering the global market 
place caused a strong business lobby for Government support.113  Notwithstanding 
the political alliance between the ANC and COSATU this lobby made useful gains 
culminating in the 1996 “GEAR” policy.114 
 
An analysis of trade union membership trends indicates a variety of factors that play 
an influencing role.  The three key sets of factors can be categorised as cyclical, 
structural and institutional.115  Cyclical factors refer to rising unemployment in times 
of economic downturn.  It is generally accepted that a downturn would impact 
negatively on membership but it has been shown that this is not always the case.  
The level of bargaining is an example of a variable which may oppose this trend. 
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Where the bargaining is conducted at a higher, multi-employer level unionisation 
levels have proved to be less vulnerable.116 
 
Structural factors are now accepted to be a greater cause of union decline than 
unemployment.117   The neo-liberal economic policies associated with free-market 
economies strongly advocate labour-market flexibility.118  This has the consequence 
of increased part-time and casual work which hinders union-organisation potential. 
Other trends associated with globalisation include privatization, downsizing and 
outsourcing.  These have all tended to erode the traditional operating base for trade 
unions.  
 
The impact on the mother-body of collective bargaining (and bargaining councils in 
particular) is the indirect impact of these trends on council representivity.  This is 
because one of the measures of council representivity is party trade-union 
membership within the sector.  This particular problem has been debated by labour-
department officials, with one suggested solution being that all “atypical” employees 
be excluded from the calculation of representivity.119  This is because of the degree 
of difficulty for union organisation amongst this particular grouping.  A second idea 
that has been floated is the compulsion that outsourced employees remain or 
become members of the majority trade-union party.120  Standing in the way of that 
suggestion is that it will fall foul of the principle of freedom of association and would 
most likely attract a constitutional challenge.121 
 
3.7 THE HISTORY OF AGREEMENT EXTENSION 
 
An important sub-component of the history of collective bargaining in South Africa, in 
the context of this dissertation, is the history of objections to the extension of 
collective agreements.  The fact that there has been a specific history in this regard 
indicates that the current objection by the FMF is not a new one and that this issue 
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has received considerable previous attention from all the social partners.  This point 
is emphasized by the MEIBC in their answering affidavit in order to highlight the fact 
that the current legislative dispensation is a product of this extensive debate. 
 
Going back to the Act of 1924 the Minister had powers of extension to all employers 
and employees as long as he regarded it as expedient and as long as the parties 
were “sufficiently representative”.  The Act of 1937 had little impact on the status quo 
with the relevant section 48(2), also making reference to expediency and sufficient 
representivity. 122   What is clear at that point in time was that the Minister was 
provided with a degree of discretion which included the capacity to grant limited 
exemptions.123 
 
The Industrial Conciliations Act of 1956 (later renamed the Labour Relations Act of 
1956) was promulgated under the watch of the National Party which had come into 
power in 1948.  This Act was amended on numerous occasions before its final 
demise when repealed by the current LRA.  At the time it was repealed extensions 
were still subject to the criteria of sufficient representivity and expediency.  One 
development from the 1937 Act was that the Council themselves could grant 
exemptions as opposed to the Minister only.124 
 
The all-important question of what constituted sufficient representivity was not 
answered by the 1956 Act125 in the form of a clear definition.  However, the then 
Director General of Labour stated three relevant measures.126  Significantly this did 
include an assessment of party employers as a percentage of all employers, which is 
not the case under the current legislation.  The other two measures were an 
assessment of employees at party firms relative to the industry and the number of 
union employees relative to the industry.127 
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If a 50% measure were achieved in all three assessment categories then the Council 
would be considered representative.  However, even if 50% were not achieved on all 
measures the Minister had discretion to extend after due consideration of a number 
of other factors.  These factors included the restrictiveness of the agreement on new 
businesses, the level of consultation with non-parties, wage differentiation flexibility, 
flexibility towards new entrants and small employers and accommodation through 
exemptions.128  A research study undertaken in 1994 / 1995 showed, in the opinion 
of Godfrey, that the Minister used to exercise his discretion in favour of extensions.129 
 
The most significant juncture in this particular historical sub-component occurred at 
the transition to political democracy.  This was the first time that all social partners 
across the political and economic spectrum engaged in debate on this particular 
issue.  The significance of this juncture, it is argued, lies not only in the breadth of the 
discussion but more particularly so by virtue of its depth.  
 
A significant intervention by the ILO in the early 1990s is said to have strongly 
influenced the thinking that underpinned the post-apartheid legislation specifically as 
it pertained to the extension of bargaining-council agreements. 130 This intervention 
was effected by the ILO’s Fact Finding and Conciliation Commission of South Africa 
in February 1992 (FFCC).  The intervention was precipitated by a complaint from 
COSATU regarding the Minister’s discretion not to extend agreements.  This 
complaint had arisen following three separate occasions where the Minister had 
applied his discretion in this manner. 
 
The FFCC report emphasized the principles of voluntarism and non-intervention as 
espoused by the ILO supervisory bodies.131  The report noted that intervention by 
public authorities should only be justifiable for major economic or social reasons or in 
the general interest.132  Importantly, in the context of this paper, the FFCC supported 
limited intervention (by the Minister) in respect of freely-concluded agreements.  It 
was their position that intervention should be restricted to technical matters only.  An 
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example would be compliance with minimum labour legislation.133  It is noteworthy 
that the explanatory memorandum for the Draft Labour Relations Bill of 1995 
specifically included the FFCC report as one of the reference points of the bill.134 
 
The Labour Force Survey (LFS) conducted in 2004 estimated that Bargaining 
Councils covered 20.3% of the total labour force in South Africa.135  The survey 
provided a breakdown of coverage across the economy indicating that in four of the 
five major sectors there was no coverage at all.136  Of the remaining five sectors 
there was only significant coverage in three of them. 137   These were the 
manufacturing, transport and community services.138 
 
The total picture from the survey is that of 7 241 951 employees employed nationally 
only 2 358 012 are registered with councils and only 335 420 are employees at non-
party firms.139  This represents a percentage of only 4.6% of all employees which are 
employed at non-party employers and covered by bargaining councils.  Whilst this 
might appear to be an insignificant number it has been noted that the number of non-
party employees reflected in the survey are only those employees employed at 
registered non-party employers.140   It does not reflect the number of employees 
employed at non-registered non-party employers.  As such it is conceded by the 
authors of the survey that undercounting of employees covered by extended 
agreements is a reality.141 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE CURRENT LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK 
 
 
 
4.1 THE COLLECTIVE-BARGAINING FRAMEWORK 
 
The Bargaining Council system forms an integral part of South Africa’s labour 
relations framework in terms of current legislation. 142   The collective-bargaining 
provisions in the LRA are extensive, effectively constituting the spine of the South 
African labour relations framework.  This framework is outlined in Chapter Three of 
the Act which follows the introductory and general protection chapters respectively.143 
 
The first section of the Act in the introductory chapter describes its purpose, which 
includes the provision of a framework for collective bargaining in respect of wages 
and other conditions of employment.  This is one of three key purposes of the Act, 
the other two being giving effect to constitutional obligations144 as well as those 
obligations incurred by virtue of our associations with the International Labour 
Organisation.145 
 
The Freedom of Association in chapter two provides the initial brace for the spine by 
removing any restrictions to the existence of its components.  These components or 
“parties” to the bargaining-council system are the trade unions on the one hand and 
the employer organisations on the other. 
 
The base of the spine is found in part A of Chapter Three. Part A provides a strong 
foundation for the trade-union party by providing for extensive organisational 
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rights.146  At the heart of the structure is the provision for “soldiers on the ground” in 
the form of union representatives in the work place.147  These foot soldiers constitute 
a crucial operating nexus between plant-level aspirations and centralised bargaining 
mandates.  They also play a pivotal role in monitoring compliance with the resultant 
negotiated collective agreements.148 
 
Equally important for purposes of sustainability is the facilitation of union funding from 
its members and access to the workplace by its officials.149  The legislation serves to 
bolster the collective bargaining environment further by providing for agency-shop 
and closed shop agreements.150  An agency shop agreement enables a union with a 
majority of members employed in a workplace or by an employer’s organisation to 
deduct an agency fee from non-members.151  This agency agreement overrides any 
other law or contractual provision in that the deduction may be effected without the 
authorisation of the non-member.152 
 
4.2 THE OPERATION OF BARGAINING COUNCILS 
 
The functions and powers of bargaining councils in terms of current legislation are 
outlined in section 28 of the Labour Relations Act.153  The core functions include the 
conclusion and enforcement of collective agreements.154  Other important functions 
of councils are dispute resolution, 155  the promotion of training and education 
schemes156 as well as the administration of industry benefit funds.157 
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For the purposes of enforcement bargaining councils have the authority to appoint 
council agents who perform a role not dissimilar to that played by department of 
labour inspectors empowered to enforce primary labour legislation such as the Basic 
Conditions of Employment Act.158 
 
The powers of a bargaining-council agent are outlined in Schedule 10 of the LRA.159  
These powers provide the agent right of entry (into a workplace) without warrant or 
notice and to require persons to disclose information relating to the implementation of 
the relevant collective agreement.160  This disclosure may be required under oath or 
affirmation.161  Any false statement in response to a question posed by a council 
agent may be used against that person in criminal proceedings relating to perjury.162  
The council agents enjoy the backing of the Labour Court which is empowered to 
issue an order against any person resisting the lawful requirements imposed by 
council agents.163 
 
Council agents are empowered to issue compliance notices in cases of non-
compliance with council agreements.  Arbitration, with the council as the applicant, 
shall follow in the event of a failure to adhere to the dictates of the order.  An 
arbitrator nominated by the council, alternatively a CCMA commissioner, shall hear 
the matter and shall be empowered to make remedial and / or punitive awards if 
he/she finds in favour of the council.  Awards of this nature are final and binding and 
executable in the same manner as those of orders of the Labour Court. 
 
The collective agreements (which agents are tasked to enforce) become binding on 
parties and non-parties to the agreement in terms of sections 31 and 32 of the LRA 
respectively.164  Those considered as “parties” to the agreement are the respective 
employer organisations and trade unions who are signatories to the agreement as 
well as their respective members which include individual employers and employees.  
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The agreement becomes legally binding on all these parties upon signing of the 
collective agreement.165  It is worth mentioning that the parties to an agreement might 
not include all the parties to a bargaining council.  It can therefore transpire that 
parties to a bargaining council may be classified as non-parties in relation to any 
specific collective agreement.  As such the bargaining council non-parties and all 
other non-parties would fall into the same boat in so far as becoming bound by the 
extension of the collective agreement in terms of section 32. 
 
The legal obligation to comply with a collective agreement in terms of section 31 is 
typically less of a driving force (than in the case of non-parties) because parties are 
voluntary signatories to the agreement.  There will, however, always be differing 
levels of satisfaction even amongst the parties to agreements, and as such there will 
certainly be occasion where council agents are required to utilise their powers to 
enforce compliance within the ranks of the parties. 
 
It is, however, the legal obligation that is founded in section 32 which has courted 
extensive and emotive debate since the inception of the Act.  This is because the 
compliance is enforced on an involuntary basis by extending the agreement to the 
non-parties.  This debate is ongoing and current and forms the essential subject 
matter of this treatise. It is therefore imperative to provide a thorough analysis of the 
mechanics of section 32. 
 
4.3 THE MECHANICS OF SECTION 32 
 
The first hurdle to the extension of a collective agreement in terms of this section 32 
is that a majority of the party trade unions and a majority of the party employer 
organisations must vote in favour of the extension.166  This vote must take place at a 
meeting of the Council and the non-parties to whom the agreement is extended must 
be identified and they must fall within the registered scope of the Council.  If this 
hurdle is crossed the Council may then elect to request the Minister to extend the 
agreement to such non-parties. 
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The Minister must, within 60 days of receiving such request, publish a notice in the 
Government Gazette that effectively binds the identified non-parties to the terms of 
the collective agreement.167  This Minister has no discretion in this regard so long as 
the first hurdle has been successfully crossed and secondly, upon the extension of 
the agreement, the majority of employees falling within the registered scope belong 
to the trade unions that are party to the bargaining council, and the majority of 
employees falling within the registered scope are employed by the employer 
organisations that are party to the bargaining council.168   In reality the effect of 
extending an agreement to non-parties is to render them parties to the agreement. 
This point was made by the Labour Appeal Court in Kem-Lin Fashions v Brunton & 
Another.169 
 
The manner in which the representivity criteria have been structured in section 32 
allows for permutations which could be perceived as being at odds with basic 
majoritarian principles.  As an example in the instance where 51% of all employees 
within the scope are “party employees” and only 51% of those employees fall under 
signatories to any particular collective agreement then one can conceivably have that 
particular agreement extended by a 26% minority faction to 74% majority faction.  
 
Despite this apparent structural bias (towards enabling extension) the legislation 
goes one step further. In the instance where the majority criteria outlined above have 
not been satisfied the Minister may still use his/her discretion to extend the 
agreement notwithstanding.  This facility made possible in terms of sub-section 32(5) 
was not contained in the original labour-relations bill of 1995. 
 
In order to extend in such circumstances the Minister must be satisfied that, firstly, 
the parties are “sufficiently representative” and secondly that a failure to extend the 
agreement will undermine collective bargaining at a sectoral level.170 
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The term “sufficiently representative” is not defined in respect of the relevant section 
of the Act nor is there any existing case law to heed.171  However, some guidance is 
provided by section 49 of the LRA.172  This section clarifies that parties to a council 
may be considered sufficiently representative for the whole of an area even if there 
are no parties in any particular part of the area.173  This view on representivity has 
significance to the extent that it may facilitate the extension of agreements into rural 
areas that are unorganised by either trade unions or employer organisations.  
 
The section does not provide a definition of “sufficiently representative” nor does it 
espouse on the criteria that should be considered to determine whether collective 
bargaining is being undermined.  In practice it appears as though the Minister is 
adopting a stricter approach to extensions.174  It has been suggested that even if one 
of the parties is in the low 40% then the agreement shall not be extended.175  As 
such it appears then that in practice this back door to extensions is guarded closely 
and there is no easy passage through it.  Godfrey, however, argues that the objective 
to promote centralised bargaining as outlined in the LRA should predispose the 
Minister to interpreting representivity more flexibly and broadly than an absolute 
majority.  I would argue that this must have been the intention of the drafters because 
any other interpretation would render clause 32(5) meaningless and redundant. 
 
In the case of Valuline CC and Others v Minister of Labour and Others,176  the 
Pietermaritzburg High Court had to consider this question.  The court elected to 
review and set aside the Minister’s decision to extend the 2010 National Main 
Collective Agreement of the National Bargaining Council for the Clothing 
Manufacturing Industry to non-parties in the clothing industry.  It did so on the basis 
that the requirements of section 32 of the Labour Relations Act of 1995 (as 
amended) (“the LRA”), which regulates the extension of collective agreements 
concluded in bargaining councils to non-parties, were not met. 
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The judgment further confirmed that the High Court has concurrent jurisdiction with 
the Labour Court to determine matters arising out of section 32 of the LRA. 
 
It is clear from this judgment that collective agreements concluded in bargaining 
councils can only be extended to non-parties if the requirements of section 32 of the 
LRA are met.  Importantly, either the Labour or High Courts can be approached to 
consider this type of dispute. 
 
4.4 THE AMENDMENTS TO SECTION 32 
 
In terms of the Labour Relations Amendment Act, 2014177 amendments have been 
effected to the wording of section 32.  These include adding further criteria that must 
be met before the Minister is able to extend an agreement to non-parties.  
 
The first of these is a requirement that bargaining councils have in place an effective 
procedure to deal with applications for exemption by non-parties.  This procedure 
must ensure that applications are heard within 30 days of submitting the 
application. 178   The second targets expediency by requiring that appeals to the 
independent body are also heard within 30 days of the appeal application.179 
 
The amendments aim to ensure a fair hearing for appellants by taking measures to 
ensure that the independent appeal body is impartial.  This is achieved by a new 
provision that would prevent any representative from either a trade union or an 
employer’s organization that is party to the council from participating in the appeals 
body.180 
 
Section 32(5), which opens the door for extensions in circumstances where there is 
not a 50% majority, is the object of amendments on two different fronts.  The first 
front would appear to close the door somewhat by requiring the Minister to invite and 
consider comments regarding the proposed agreement extension.181   This would 
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appear to be aimed at providing non-parties (who are in the majority) to have their 
voice heard before the Minister may elect to impose the agreement on them.  The 
second front would appear to lever the door back open by allowing the Minister to 
specifically consider the extent of non-standard employment in the sector as a 
criterion to determine sufficient representivity.182  These non-standard work practices 
include the provision of labour through temporary employment services, employees 
on fixed-term contracts as well as part-time employees.  
 
It is generally accepted that non-standard employment practices serve to inhibit trade 
union organization.  As such it is probable that the intention behind this amendment 
is to allow some elasticity below the 50% threshold in sectors where there are 
significant non-standard work practices. 
 
The MEIBC in their answering affidavit noted that the proposed amendments (at that 
time) have been the subject of negotiations amongst all the social partners at 
NEDLAC. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE 
 
 
 
5.1 BACKGROUND TO THE FREE MARKET FOUNDATION 
 
The Free Market Foundation is a section 21 company that was registered in 1975 in 
terms of the Companies Act 61 of 1973.183  The Foundation describes itself in its 
Notice of Motion as an independent policy, research and education organisation, 
promoting the principles of limited government, economic freedom and individual 
liberty.184  The Foundation argues that its status as an independent public-benefit 
organisation and the ideals that it fosters, form the basis for its locus standi in this 
particular matter.185 
 
The Minister of Labour eventually responded to the FMF’s legal challenge by filing 
responding papers with the Court on 17 April 2014.  The FMF has pointed out that 
this is more than a year after the initial notice of motion in March 2013 and views the 
various delays and requests for extension as a tactic to obstruct the course of justice 
for the unemployed.186  The FMF filed its final affidavits with the courts on 20 May 
2014 and is currently seeking a date for a hearing.187  Chairman of the FMF, Herman 
Mashaba, has questioned why the Minister, as an executive tasked with the job of 
protecting South Africa’s constitution, would be part of delaying the progress of the 
challenge.188  Mr Mashaba has also questioned why the Minister would not want to 
have the opportunity to apply her mind in the process of extending agreements.189 
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In its responding affidavit respondent no 20, the Metal and Engineering Industry 
Bargaining Council (MEIBC), has questioned the appropriateness of this question 
being debated in a court of law.  Instead the Council contends that the wide range of 
competing political and economic interests makes this topic the one best suited to the 
legislative process.190 
 
5.2 ALLEGED CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS 
 
The Foundation argues that the parties of bargaining councils are private actors and 
as such the delegation of regulatory powers to these private actors (by the state) 
constitutes a violation of the constitution.191  It contends that this delegation to private 
actors violates the principle of legality embodied in section 1 of the Constitution.192  
This is because the matters that have been delegated constitute a “core coercive 
function”.193  This is the first alleged constitutional violation. 
 
The second is that the manner of extension violates the principle of freedom of 
association as contained in section 18 of the Constitution.194  This submission is 
based on the assertion that persons outside of the bargaining-council framework are 
required to comply with rules that have been formulated by other persons who have 
no “legitimate, responsive or accountable” authority over them.195 
 
The third violation according to the FMF is that, because the private actors are not 
accountable through the democratic political process, their control over the current 
regulatory framework falls foul of section 33 of the Constitution.196  This is because 
the current framework violates their right to lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair 
administrative action. 
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The fourth alleged violation as a consequence of the delegated authority is the 
violation of the right to dignity in terms of section 8 of the Constitution.197  It is alleged 
that the obligation to submit to the will of others who are beyond state supervision 
impinges on important matters of self-actualisation.198 
 
The fifth and final constitutional violation is that of section 9, governing the right to 
equality.199  The argument goes that a failure to vest any supervisory powers in the 
hands of the Minister allows for unfair discrimination against work seekers and 
potential new business entrants.200 
 
It is argued further that the system serves to distort majoritarian principles such that a 
minority effectively imposes its will on the majority.201  The Foundation’s case also 
relies heavily on the perceived negative impact of centralised bargaining on job-
creation opportunities.202  Counsel for the Foundation has indicated that in this regard 
they will be drawing on the work of economists from Europe, Australasia and the 
United States.203 
 
5.3 THE HEADS OF ARGUMENT 
 
The Free Market Foundation is the applicant in a matter that has been lodged in the 
Gauteng North High Court that amounts to a constitutional challenge of certain 
provisions contained in section 32 of the Act.204  The respondents in this matter are 
listed in the notice of motion as the Minister of Labour (first respondent), the Minister 
of Justice and Constitutional Development (second respondent) with the remaining 
forty-eight respondents comprising of bargaining councils registered in terms of 
section twenty-nine of the Act.205 
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The challenge against section 32 is mounted on two fronts.  The first is that private 
actors (in the form of parties to bargaining councils) should not be permitted to 
impose their collective party agreements on non-parties and especially so in the 
absence of any discretionary gate-keeping by the Minister.206  As a means to address 
this lack of discretion the applications call for an order substituting the word ‘must’ 
with the word “may” in section 32(2).  
 
5.3.1 BARGAINING COUNCILS ARE “PRIVATE” ACTORS 
 
The FMF argues against entrusting the parties to bargaining councils (as private 
actors) to impose their own collective agreements on non-parties without any 
intervening Government discretion.207 
 
Instead the FMF argues that an organ of State should be empowered and mandated 
to apply discretion in the public interest prior to any extension of the agreement.208  
The FMF argues further that, in order to apply this discretion properly the audi 
alterem partem should apply which requirement would necessitate a proper 
hearing.209  A reading of the Act indicates that there is no requirement for those non-
parties (which the extension intends to bind) to be consulted or heard prior to the 
request for extension.  It is the absence of any ministerial discretion or due-hearing 
process which the FMF relies on to contend the unconstitutionality of section 32.  
 
The FMF makes reference to the history of collective bargaining in South Africa, 
noting that ministerial discretion has always been a vital ingredient in the pot that 
forms extension of agreements.210  From the original extension legislation (contained 
in the Act of 1924) the Minister, whilst empowered to extend, retained discretionary 
decision-making power.  The Minister had to firstly satisfy himself/herself that the 
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parties were representative in the Industry and secondly that a failure to extend 
would have the consequence of unfair competition.211 
 
This principle of ministerial discretion (with regard to agreement extensions) survived 
all following versions of the Act, receiving its final marching orders only within the 
post-apartheid legislation. 212   The 1956 Act required that the Minister determine 
“sufficient representivity” prior to extending the industrial-council agreement.213  The 
Minister also had to consider the rather subjective and vague criterion of 
“expediency” when applying his/her discretion.  The important distinction is that 
discretion had to be applied.  Thomson has suggested that the removal of discretion 
may serve to prevent arbitrary ministerial intervention but it does prevent beneficial 
scrutiny. 214   Thomson noted further that a lack of scrutiny could have negative 
economic consequences in instances where the relationship between the negotiating 
parties is too “cosy”.215 
 
With regard to the representivity measure the then Director-General of Labour stated 
three measures that should be considered.216  Quite significant is that the currently 
excluded measure of employer-party firms as a proportion of all registered firms was 
included as one of these three measures.217 
 
The Director-General provided further criteria for the Minister to consider in 
determining “sufficient representivity” in terms of the 1956 Act.  These criteria had a 
strong bias towards protecting the interests of small business. Included in them were 
whether the agreement was restrictive on the establishment of small businesses, the 
extent of non-party consultation and wage differentiation on an area basis and the 
extent to which small business has been accommodated through exemption 
procedures or general exclusions.218 
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This post-apartheid legislation changed the game such that the Minister is now 
forced to extend an agreement if the section 32 representation criteria are met.  
There is no discretion to reject, the Council requests on policy grounds or in the 
public interest.219  The MEIBC in their answering affidavit refer to Godfrey’s assertion 
that this change was in response to two key problems that had been identified with 
the previous legislation as it applied to Industrial Councils.  These were the issues of 
representivity and the exercise of ministerial discretion.220 
 
This change in tack with regard to agreement extensions came about despite the fact 
that the principle (of ministerial discretion) stood firm in other areas of post-apartheid 
labour legislation.  The most relevant example is that of sectoral determinations in 
terms of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act.221  It has been suggested that the 
changes to Labour Relations Act were certainly no accident and have served to 
aggravate the oppressive nature of bargaining councils.222 
 
In terms of section 55 of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act the Minister is 
required to consider a report from a commission that has made recommendations on 
what should be included in a specific sectoral determination.  The Minister is 
provided with explicit powers to refer the report back to the commission if there are 
any areas of disagreement.223  Any further (responding) report from the commission 
may cause the Minister to make a sectoral determination.224  It is, however, clear 
from the wording that there is no specific obligation in this regard.  This ministerial 
discretion with regard to determining wages in unorganised sectors has been in 
existence from the onset of the Wage Act of 1925. 
 
Support for this call for greater ministerial discretion can be found in the 
Government’s Growth, Employment and Redistribution strategy launched in June of 
1996.  The strategy document suggested that collective agreements should not be 
extended to non-parties unless there was reasonable certainty that there would be no 
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consequent job losses. 225   It was proposed that the Minister be given greater 
discretion to consider these labour-market implications prior to giving extensions the 
green light.  
 
5.3.2 MAJORITARIAN PRINCIPLE IS VIOLATED 
 
On the second front the Foundation challenges the form of majoritarianism contained 
in section 32, alleging that it does not amount to “true majoritarianism”.226  Reliance is 
placed on the principle that, if the will of some is to be imposed on others, then this 
collective intention must at least represent the will of the majority. 227   The FMF 
argues that in terms of the way the section is currently structured the 
abovementioned is not the case. 
 
In this regard the foundation effectively argues that representivity should be 
assessed in terms of employers rather than employees that are party to the 
bargaining council.228  Empirical evidence suggests that adjusting the measure in this 
manner would have a significant impact.  Whereas studies have shown that party 
employers employ 63% of all employees covered by councils, these party employers 
only constitute 41% of all employers.229 
 
Godfrey suggests that the omission of an employer-representivity measure is 
notable. 230   He argues that the existence of such a measure would pressurize 
employers’ organisations to recruit smaller members.  This in turn would require a 
more accommodating disposition towards them.231 
 
Industries of significance that would no longer enjoy a majority in terms of this 
measure include the Metal and Engineering industry, the Clothing Industry, Road 
Freight and SA Road Passenger, Textile Industry and Geographic Regions of the 
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Furniture Industry. 232   The only sizeable industry (with a genuine non-party 
component) that would still enjoy a majority on this measure would be the motor 
industry.233  In this industry the employers enjoy a marginal 54% majority which might 
be at risk if one factors in that not all non-party employers are registered. 
 
This impact of factoring-in unregistered employers has shown to have a major impact 
on representivity in some sectors.  A study of the textile industry compared data from 
a labour-force survey as a means to estimate the extent of unregistered employees 
in the industry.  The results of this study indicate that as many as 46% of the industry 
employees are unregistered.234  Given that these employees are almost certainly all 
employed at non-party employers and with little or no union membership the impact 
on “real” levels of council representivity is profound. 
 
The problem, however, is access to reliable data on unregistered employers.  The 
problem with using alternative databases such as that of the UIF and Compensation 
Commissioner is the allocation of data to the correct sector.235  This is because of the 
lack of uniformity with regard to sectoral definitions.  
 
The Foundation has proposed an amendment to the wording so as to reflect their 
position that employer numbers should form the true basis of representivity.  These 
proposed amendments would be inserted in two different sub-sections which both 
deal with representivity.  The first covers representivity amongst parties to the 
Council236 whilst the other covers representivity within the registered scope of the 
Council. 
 
The applicant also has issue with sub-section 32(5) which as currently worded, 
allows for the possibility of agreement extension even in the absence of a majority.  
The proposed amendment in this regard is the deletion of the entire sub-section.  
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5.3.3 THE ECONOMIC ARGUMENTS 
5.3.3.1 THE NEGATIVE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF EXTENDING AGREEMENTS 
 
The Foundation argues essentially that the extension of party agreements negates 
market competition and creates a barrier to entry for both small employers and the 
unemployed.237   Herman Mashaba, chairman of the Foundation, argues that the 
extension of agreements not only limits job creation but also leads to higher 
consumer prices, resulting in an uncompetitive economy.238  The FMF emphasises 
the critical nature of their challenge in the context of South Africa’s pressing 
unemployment levels.  The unemployment level quoted by the FMF is the 2012 level 
of 25% which they juxtapose against the 13% that prevailed in 1994. 239   This 
amounts to 4.5 million unemployed South Africans with a further, 2.1 million 
underemployed and a further 2.3 million that would like to work but have become 
discouraged by the negative prospects of finding work.240  Updated employment data 
for 2014 from Stats South Africa indicates an increase in unemployment in the last 
three quarters to June 2014.  The second-quarter figure of 25,5% represents a three-
year peak and is set to climb further amidst an economy that cannot absorb the 
increase in new entrants into the labour market.241  In order for the unemployment 
rate to be stabilised the economy would be required to create approximately 150 000 
new jobs per quarter.242 
 
What has been evident from the second quarter stats is that job growth has only 
occurred in the Government sector, being off-set by losses in the agricultural, 
manufacturing, mining, construction, utilities and finance sectors.243  This is clearly a 
move in the wrong direction in terms of the increased tax burden and consequent 
Government debt.  What is of particular concern for Iraj Abedian, MD of Pan African 
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Investments is the double digit increases that have been taking place against the 
backdrop of this high unemployment.  Abedian attributes this to the labour militancy 
which has seen a five month strike in the platinum industry and a four week strike in 
the engineering sector.244  He suggests that small and medium size business which 
accounts for 65% of formal employment in South Africa cannot afford these 
increases. 
 
This suggestion by Abedian has been proved to be more than mere speculation.  
This is borne out by the fact that small employers in the metal and engineering 
sector, organised by NEASA, embarked on an unprecedented lock-out that followed 
the settlement agreement that should have heralded a return to work for striking 
workers.  NEASA embarked on the lock-out to reinforce their demands on the issue 
of affordable wages and clearly illustrates the extent of their frustration with the 
bargaining council agreement.  This was after their counterpart Employers 
Federation SEIFSA, which represents the majority of big employers in the sector, 
signed for a double digit increase with the trade union parties.  NEASA’s other 
demands included an improved exemption policy and a lower minimum wage for 
employees entering the industry.245 
 
Herman Mashaba of the FMF, commenting on the wage agreement reached in the 
engineering sector, had this to say: 
 
‘It is baffling that whilst all agree that this current agreement will do nothing to stem 
the job losses in the metal and engineering sector, it is still being welcomed as a 
good result.”246 
 
Rod Harper, senior partner at Cowan-Harper attorneys has also shared his opinion 
on the metal and engineering bargaining council suggesting that the council had to 
ask whether smaller employers should be expected to pay the same increases as the 
larger employers.247  Harper points to other councils that allow for greater flexibility 
such as differentiated rates between urban and rural areas.  This is not so in the case 
of the metal and engineering industry which does not allow for a two tier system.  
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This is notwithstanding the fact that certain large SEIFSA members are allowed to 
bargain at company level.248 
 
Of particular concern with regard to the unemployment problem is the impact on the 
youth where only 12% of persons between fifteen and twenty-four are employed.  
This compares with a figure of 40% in most other emerging economies, emphasizing 
that the unemployment debate is of particular concern in South Africa.249  A job-
growth rate of only 0,7% for the period 2000 – 9250 suggests there shall be no quick 
fix to the unemployment problem which can be causally linked to a variety of other 
social problems.251  These include criminal activity, drug abuse and unsafe sex.252  
Very importantly, long-term unemployment causes despair and hopelessness which, 
as the Arab Spring has proved, is a recipe for political turmoil. It is little wonder that a 
new political party such as the Economic Freedom Front (EFF), which speaks to this 
demographic, was able to make such inroads in their first national election. 
 
The second distinctive characteristic of the South African socio-economic landscape, 
other than high unemployment, is its low market competitiveness.253  The FMF note 
the significance of this fact in the context of evidence which links high levels of labour 
market regulation with low efficiencies.254 
 
The FMF makes use of expert witness, Professor Neil Rankin, to support their socio-
economic arguments relating to their claim.255  Rankin’s report contained in his expert 
affidavit concludes that section 32 extensions in their current form have served to 
disadvantage the South African economy. 256   This disadvantage, according to 
Rankin, manifests in the form of causing and exacerbating unemployment, retarding 
employment growth, undermining competitiveness and increasing prices for 
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consumers.257  In the introduction to his report Rankin paints a picture of bargaining 
councils as a system of “insiders” that functions to the detriment of a group of 
“outsiders”.  He describes the insiders as typically comprising larger business and 
organised labour whilst the “outsiders” are made up of the unemployed, small 
business, potential entrepreneurs and their would- be employees.258 
 
5.3.3.2 DAVID VERSUS GOLIATH 
 
This dynamic of conflicting interests between large and small employers and their 
respective influence within the Council system has been a topical issue during the 
Metal and Engineering strikes of 2014.  NEASA, the employers’ organisation 
representing mostly smaller employers has openly criticised the Minister of Labour 
for allegedly favouring the employers’ organisation SEIFSA, that represents all the 
large employers in the industry.259  NEASA represents 3 000 members in the Metal 
and Engineering sector, and their chief executive, Gerhard Papenfus, claims that 
even more of his members’ products are being manufactured outside of South Africa. 
This has resulted in approximately fifty of NEASA members closing their doors every 
month.260  Many of these companies, according to Papenfus, used to be competitive 
exporters. 
 
Papenfus views the Labour Relations Act as the biggest threat to these businesses 
because it compels the smaller businesses to comply with the agreements that are 
struck between SEIFSA and NUMSA within the Metal and Engineering Bargaining 
Council.261  He accused the counterpart employers’ organisation SEIFSA of breaking 
ranks and going behind NEASA’s back to broker a deal with NUMSA that will destroy 
his smaller-member companies.262  Papenfus explains that his member companies 
do not have the same resources as the bigger SEIFSA companies and are therefore 
not in a position to make the same offer.  He believes NUMSA is alert to this fact and 
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“know where their salvation lies”, and hence the bilateral discussions between the 
dominant trade-union and employer association on the council.263 
 
The lack of financial muscle of smaller employers is not the only inhibiting factor in 
order to comply with bargaining-council agreements.  The administrative burden of 
compliance hits smaller employers harder as they do not possess the same 
economies to compete with the scale maintained by larger employers.  Papenfus 
claims that the same amount of work is required for a payroll for 5 employees as that 
required for a payroll of 100 employees.264 
 
Johan Maree, Professor of Sociology at the University of Cape Town, agrees that the 
Industrial Council system has generally suited larger employers and registered trade 
unions in that the extension of their agreements has served to prevent undercutting 
of wages by smaller employers and non-unionised workers.265  Maree suggested 
further that this was the key reason to explain the longevity and durability of the 
industrial-council system.266 
 
The notion of exclusivity and protectionism within the context of labour institutions is 
not a new concept.  Craft unions in particular were criticised in the past for having a 
similar objective which was to protect their domain of scarce skills so as to ensure 
the longevity of their high standard of living.   
 
Empirical research on the Industrial Council system has suggested that, whilst party 
employers are typically larger firms, they are not always in the majority.267  This 
statistic has raised the question as to how it is then possible that a select group of 
larger employers are capable of controlling the mandates of employer associations 
and ultimately council agreements.  An answer to this question was suggested in a 
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different study of the Western Cape Clothing Industry.268  This study found that whilst 
larger firms might constitute a minority of employers in absolute numbers, their 
representatives at association meetings had the expertise to sway employer thinking.  
 
Support for this dissertation would come from the author of this treatise based on his 
experiences as secretary of the Port Elizabeth Engineers Association over a period 
of fifteen years.269  During this period it was found that the affairs of the Association 
were dominated by the human-resource professionals employed by the larger firms 
in the Association.  In this case the requirement to sway small employers was not as 
relevant due to the fact that small employers were in fact seldom in attendance. 
 
This does beg the question as to why these smaller employers continue to associate 
with the employer organisations if they effectively do not have a voice within the 
forum.  The answer to this apparent anomaly may lie somewhere within the concept 
of “reluctant collectivism”.  This phrase was coined by Donnelly when researching 
employer views on associability shortly after the new political dispensation in South 
Africa.  Donnelly suggested that this behaviour is largely a consequence of insecurity 
by employers in the face of a perceived combined threat from the institutions of 
Government and organised labour.270  This insecurity would be enhanced in the case 
of smaller employers who are generally less resourced to cope with these threats. 
 
5.3.3.3 AN UNLIKELY LIAISON 
 
According to Rankin the unfettered extension of agreements has the effect of 
creating a common interest (amongst bargaining-council parties) to raise the cost of 
employment.271  This argument seeks to change the historical view of organised 
capital and labour as diametrically opposing forces to one where there is a common 
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interest to stand together in defence against the third party outsiders - which it might 
be argued includes the South African economy itself.   
 
A review of the dynamics that existed within the Steel and Engineering Industrial 
Council way back in 1987 confirms that council parties had by then already 
recognised the extent of their interdependence.  At that time what is now one of 
South Africa’s biggest trade unions, viz NUMSA, had been launched following the 
amalgamation of a number of unions.272  Up until that point in time NUMSA’s primary 
predecessor, MAWU, had followed a strategy of being the Council’s prodigal child 
and chief antagonist.  They filled this role by being party to Council negotiations but 
always refused to sign the industry agreement.273  This tactic was in support of their 
strategy to retain enterprise-level bargaining which they viewed as their primary 
power base.  
 
By 1987, however, their power base (and numbers) had grown to the extent that a 
failure to sign the agreement by NUMSA would have had the effect that the non-
parties would be in the majority.  What NUMSA recognised at this point was that a 
failure to extend the agreement had the potential to collapse the major employer 
association.  This was because employers would resign in mass from the association 
if their non-member employer counterparts were not obliged to pay the same 
increases.  NUMSA realised further that a collapse of the employer association was 
not in their interests as it would spell the end of collective bargaining, and with it the 
ability to operate effectively on a national level.274 
 
It is argued that the extension of agreements benefits big business by significantly 
reducing the business prospects of would-be small (new) business entrants.  This is 
because these smaller, under-capitalised entities are typically more labour intensive 
and as such more sensitive to the price of labour.  Support for this argument comes 
from business partner, MD Jo Schwenke, who points to the furniture-manufacturing 
industry as a good example.275  Schwenke highlights the fact that the big players in 
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the industry are generally capital intensive with a low labour to capital ratio.276  As 
such the impact of an increase in labour costs is easier to absorb. 
 
The party unions and their members are also beneficiaries to the extent that the 
system serves to prop up the floor price of labour.277  Rankin finds support for his 
thesis (regarding the negative impact on employment) from Professors Nattrass and 
Seekings of the University of Cape Town.278  He quotes from what he regards as 
their seminal work on the topic as follows: 
 
“The extension of agreements, the [National bargaining council for the clothing 
manufacturing industry] compliance drive, and resulting job losses puts paid to the 
argument that South Africa’s bargaining councils do not affect employment. Indeed 
the story illustrates how, under the hypocritical guise of promoting ‘decent work’ 
labour-market institutions and industrial policies can create an unholy coalition of the 
state, a trade union, and metro-based, relatively capital intensive employers whose 
actions can inflict massive job-destroying structural adjustment on a labour intensive 
industry.” 
 
The report leans on the case study of the Clothing Industry in KZN and in particular 
the developments in the Newcastle region. 279   These developments followed a 
bargaining-council decision in January 2010 to close down non-compliant employers 
in this region.280  By November of that year 26 employers had been “successfully” 
closed down but the impact of job losses was severe. Faced with potential job 
losses of up to 16 700 jobs the Council instituted a moratorium on the council raids 
on non-compliant employers.281  This moratorium was conditional on a phasing in of 
compliance.282  Almost two years later up to seventy-two per cent of employers were 
still non-compliant and, although these were predominantly small businesses, they 
employed a majority of the known employees in the industry.283 
 
                                                          
276 Ibid. 
277 The Expert Report. 
278 The Expert Report 65 of the Notice of Motion. 
279 Ibid. 
280 The Expert Report 67 of the Notice of Motion. 
281 Ibid. 
282 Ibid. 
283 Ibid. 
49 
A study of the actual remuneration being paid at the non-compliant employers 
indicated a large gap between actual and bargaining-council minimums. 284  
Thousands of employees in the Industry were being paid less than a third of the 
prescribed council minimums. 285   Whilst this does not paint a pretty picture of 
working conditions it is pointed out that pay for performance had become a typical 
feature of remuneration structures at non-compliant firms. 286   This has the 
consequence of aligning pay with productivity with the result that in some cases 
productive employees received as much as double the prescribed minimums.287 
 
Bargaining-council agreements, however, effectively rule out this type of wage 
model because they require that any incentive pay be over and above the minimum 
wage.288  This restriction on a productivity-based wage model has a greater impact 
on the lower end of the clothing market that competes on price with highly 
productive foreign competitors.289  These imposed conditions forced the hand of 
local manufacturers to lobby for import-tariff barriers in order to maintain their 
margins.290   Their lobbying bore fruit in 2006 when voluntary export restrictions 
(VERs) were achieved following negotiations with China.  
 
These gains from the negotiation table would have been welcomed in the 
manufacturing sector as some form of relief from the pressures exerted by 
bargaining-council agreements.  The real loser in this scenario, however, is the 
clothing consumer and in particular those poorer consumers at the lower end of the 
market.291  A study by Rankin and Edwards in 2012 concluded that the impact of 
these VER’s caused an average 6 - 11 per cent hike on clothing prices.292  It was 
estimated that the total cost of the VERs was in the region of R429 million to R857 
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million.  This was calculated to be the equivalent of providing a wage subsidy of 
between 15 - 31 per cent to all employees in the sector.293 
 
This argument is not new and had been espoused by advocates of labour-market 
flexibility soon after the promulgation of the first post-apartheid labour legislation.  
The South African Foundation (SAF) produced a macro-economic policy in 1996 that 
targeted the extension of bargaining-council agreements.294  Their argument was that 
extension of agreements allowed what they termed “insiders” (both employers and 
employees) to price new entrants out of the market place. 295   The victims, they 
argued, were mainly small businesses and the unemployed. 
 
This argument for labour market flexibility had not gone unnoticed by the ANC 
Government since the advent of democracy.  Indeed, as early as 1996 the 
Government introduced their Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) 
strategy which called for greater ministerial discretion relating to the extension of 
collective agreements.296 
 
Later in 1999 President Mbeki, in his opening of Parliament speech, announced a 
review of labour legislation in response to the criticism of its negative impact on 
investment and job creation.297  The findings of this review informed the contents of 
the Labour Relations Bill of 2000.  It was also reflected in the Labour Ministry’s 
“programme of action” at the time (1999-2004).298  In terms of this programme there 
was an agreement to amend labour legislation in response to demands from 
business quarters for the relaxation of sectoral-agreement extensions.299 
 
This Bill included a provision whereby non-parties would be entitled to submit 
commentary before the Minister took a final decision to extend a collective 
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agreement.  The provision was however omitted from the final draft in 2002 whilst 
pro-council measures such as improved enforcement powers were retained.300 
 
The post-democracy ANC Government was not the first South African Government to 
give serious attention to the matter of labour-market deregulation.  The enormous 
economic pressure that was brought to bear on the South African economy in the 
1980’s caused a shift in National Party thinking.  Whereas the Party had historically 
supported the Industrial Council system its labour-market policy became more 
aligned with free-market thinking.301  The promotion of small business became a 
priority agenda item and this focussed attention on the potentially inhibiting effect of 
industrial-council agreements on this sector.  This shift in policy manifested by way of  
Government circulars which were distributed to industrial councils from the mid-
1980s. 302   These circulars called for the accommodation of small businesses 
including special dispensations for rural areas.303  Small businesses also had to be 
informed of the opportunity to apply for exemption.  Quite importantly in the context of 
the arguments in this paper, adherence to these guidelines was taken into account 
when deciding whether council agreements would be extended.  The key point to be 
emphasized is that there was a decision to be made by the Minister. 
 
The Free Market Foundation argues along similar lines to the SAF.  The FMF argues 
that a lack of competition on wages facilitates the trade unions’ objective of achieving 
higher benefits for their own members.304  It is argued further that the employers 
party to the agreements, are only satisfied to reach agreement on inflated wages in 
the event that they are extended to non-parties and as such would prevent their entry 
into the particular sectoral arena.305  The Foundation refers to this common interest in 
inflating wages as “rent-seeking”, arguing that the negative economic consequences 
include stunted entrepreneurship and increased unemployment.306 
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CHAPTER SIX 
RESPONSE FROM THE METAL AND ENGINEERING INDUSTRY 
 
 
 
6.1 BACKGROUND TO THE MEIBC 
 
The Metal and Engineering Industry Bargaining Council (MEIBC) covers a wide 
range of activities that include the production of iron and steel as well as the full 
spectrum of engineering sectors.  These sectors range from manufacturing, ship-
building, electrical engineering and also includes the plastic industry.307 
 
The Council has four registered employer organisations that are active on the 
Council.  These are the Steel and Engineering Industries Federation of South Africa 
(SEIFSA), the Federated Employer’s Organisation of South Africa (FEASA), the 
National Employer’s Association of South Africa (NEASA) and the Plastic Converters’ 
Association of South Africa (PCASA).308  Juxtaposed on the other side of the Council 
fence are six trade unions that are parties to the Council.  These unions are 
Chemical, Energy, Paper, Printing, Wood and Allied Workers Union (CEPPWAWU), 
Metal and Electrical Workers Union of South Africa (MEWUSA), Solidarity MWU, 
Union Association of South Africa (UASA), National Union of Metal Workers of South 
Africa (NUMSA) and the South African Equity Workers Union (SAEWA). 
 
There are 10 293 employers registered with the Council on a national basis. 
Fractionally fewer than two-thirds of these employers are non-parties (6787).  The 
total employee strength in the industry is 318 810 of which fifty-two per cent are 
employed by the party employers.309  These statistics confirm the generally accepted 
perception that party employers are on average larger than non-party employers.  An 
analysis of employers in the industry with fewer than 10 employees shows that as 
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much as 75% are non-party employers.  An analysis of employers with more than 
200 employees indicates a non-party percentage at a surprisingly high figure of 
40%.310  Whilst this might lend some credence to the MEIBC ‘s contention that there 
is a fair spread of employer size in both non-party and party employers it is clear that 
at the lowest levels there is a significant non-party presence.  It would also have 
been interesting to have access to the statistics pertaining to the really big employers 
who employ above 1 000 employees.  It is probable that an analysis in this regard 
would indicate a very low non-party constituency.  This is significant in light of the 
arguments levelled at the extent of influence the exceptionally big employers have 
within the employer caucus. 
 
Historically, the most influential of these organisations have been SEIFSA on the 
employers’ side and NUMSA on the employees’ side.   
 
6.2 THE RESPONSE FROM THE MEIBC 
6.2.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
According to Lucio Trentini, Operations Director for SEIFSA, the MEIBC’s decision to 
submit their own responding papers was motivated largely by the fact that as the 
largest and oldest Council they arguably have the most to lose as a consequence of 
the FMF proposals.311  It was for this reason that all the parties to the Council (aside 
from NEASA), and especially NUMSA, felt strongly that it would not be prudent to be 
simply part of a combined bargaining-council response.  Instead it was felt that the 
MEIBC should take a lead in defending the matter. 312   Trentini confirmed that 
NEASA, the single biggest employer association on the Council, had gone on record 
as supporting the FMF proposals.313 
 
The answering affidavit is submitted by Mr Thuli Mthiyani, employed as General 
Secretary of the MEIBC.  Initial reference is made to the nature of the relief sought by 
the FMF suggesting that the implications thereof would be far-reaching for the entire 
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labour-relations landscape.  It is contended that their comprehensive response has 
been formulated with this in mind.314 
 
Before addressing the actual arguments the MEIBC makes a legal point of 
suggesting that the High Court is not the appropriate forum to consider the 
application.  The FMF is accused of strategically electing the High Court route as a 
way to circumvent the Labour Appeal Court on the legal path that could potentially 
end in the Constitutional Court.  The MEIBC argues that this negates the opportunity 
for the Labour Appeal Court, which, along with the Labour Court, has been 
established for the purpose of on-going interpretation and administration of the LRA, 
to consider the matter.315  As such the Constitutional Court would be denied access 
to a judgment from the LAC, and it is on this basis that the MEIBC has submitted, on 
the principle of forum non-conveniens, that the High Court should decline to hear the 
matter. 
 
That said, the MEIBC proceeds with a response which can be categorised along 
three broad fronts.  The first of these presents a defence against the allegations of 
victimisation and helplessness of smaller employers within the bargaining-council 
environment.  The Council’s exemption policy and procedure are the fortress upon 
which this defence is built.  The other key weapons in this arsenal include the relief 
available in the form of exemption appeals and court reviews, as well as the extent of 
inclusion of small employers within the council system.  It is argued that the flexibility 
forged by these avenues negates any potential negative economic consequences, if 
there are indeed any at all.  In this regard the Council turns to research which 
concludes that there is no proof that bargaining-council agreements impact 
negatively on unemployment levels. 
 
The second front focusses on the politico-legal context of bargaining councils.  The 
point is made that these institutions have not been crafted from within a vacuum but 
are instead the product of extensive debate amongst the key social stakeholders.  
Most importantly this includes the mandatory negotiations that take place within 
NEDLAC as part of the legislative development process.  It is argued that this is the 
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democratic womb from which the LRA has been born and that the bargaining-council 
framework is a core-support structure upholding the objectives of this legislation.  It is 
on this basis that any limitation of constitutional rights, if there are indeed any, would 
in any event be justified in terms of the limitation clause.  The accusation of Council’s 
being private actors is vehemently denied, noting that they are accountable and are 
subject to judicial review in terms of PAJA. 
 
The third and final front is to some extent an extension of the second.  The focus 
here is on the positive benefits for employees, industry and society at large that flow 
from the Council system.  These include retirement benefits, a decent living wage, 
safe work environments as well as capacity to fulfil statutory requirements.  It is 
argued that a successful application by the FMF would collapse the Council system 
along with these benefits, and it is suggested that this is in fact the FMF’s agenda. 
 
6.2.2 THE FIRST FRONT 
6.2.2.1 THE EXEMPTION DEFENCE 
 
In terms of the requirements of the LRA, the constitution of a bargaining council must 
include a procedure whereby a party affected by a collective agreement may apply to 
be exempted from the provisions of such agreement.316  This procedure must make 
provision for an appeal to an independent body in the event that the exemption is 
refused.317  It would be fair to say, based on a reading of the MEIBC answering 
affidavit that their purported efficiency in which they comply with this statutory 
requirement is the foundation on which they have built their responding arguments.  
 
The Council goes as far as asserting that all the FMF contentions lose credence 
when juxtaposed against the effectiveness of their exemptions system.  The MEIBC 
are particularly critical of the FMF’s position on exemptions as contained in their 
founding papers.  They accuse the FMF of a making a “bland, general and 
unsubstantiated statement” regarding the exemption process and prospects of 
success. 318   The various FMF contentions which are, according to the MEIBC, 
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stumped by the exemption process include an alleged lack of due process, the right 
to freedom of association, alleged infringement on the right to dignity, alleged barriers 
to entry and alleged lack of accountability.  It is on this basis that the MEIBC 
vehemently defends their position that the bargaining-council scheme does not 
violate any constitutional right.319 
 
The MEIBC alleges that the whole premise on which Rankin bases his economic 
arguments fall flat in the face of the reality that is the exemption process.320  They 
point to the exemption statistics as proof of a successful exemptions regime.  This 
success negates any argument of collusion between the bigger players.  It is 
Rankin’s alleged disregard for the exemption provisions which renders his report as 
being “significantly flawed” in the eyes of the MEIBC.321  Whilst the MEIBC stops 
short of outrightly disputing Rankin’s postulations regarding the differing impact of 
wage increases on capital-intensive operations versus labour-intensive operations, 
they do point out that these nuances can and will be considered in any exemption 
application.322 
 
The MEIBC points to their National exemptions policy as proof that the current form 
of extensions does not inhibit small business.  This is because their policy specifically 
caters for small and struggling businesses.  The “olive branch” extended to small 
businesses comes in the form of section 3 of this national exemptions policy.  This 
section facilitates an exemption from the provisions of the main agreement of the 
council for businesses that employ no more than ten scheduled employees, and 
which has been in existence for fewer than three years.  Any motivation for 
exemption in terms of this clause must specifically include reference to the impact of 
the application on the ability to retain or increase employment in the business.  
 
Given that this type of exemption is only applicable to small employers it could be 
viewed as surprising that such a strong emphasis is placed on these “impact on 
employment” criteria.  If the application were to be considered positively on the basis 
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that it might increase employment levels this cannot be on a significant scale 
because, if it were, then the employer would be excluded from this exemption avenue 
by virtue of exceeding the maximum employee threshold.  On the other hand, if the 
application were to be considered on the basis of retaining jobs, then one is 
effectively talking about retaining the business itself.  The small size of the business 
in terms of employee strength means that in all probability there is not an essential 
difference between the two. 
 
Neeva Makgetla, former policy chief for COSATU, quoted an 80% successful 
exemption rate in arguing that the impact of agreement extensions was overstated.323  
She also argues that the number of private sector employees covered by the 
extension of bargaining-council agreements is minimal.  A possible counter to this 
could be that there might be more private sector employees in any specific industry if 
bargaining-council agreements were not extended in the first place. 
 
SEIFSA holds a similar view in support of the exemption process but unsurprisingly 
Gerhard Papenfus of NEASA begs to differ.  Papenfus suggests that SEIFSA’s 
purported reliance on the exemption route as a way out for smaller employers is a 
“spacious claim”.324   According to him SEIFSA relies on the exemption route to 
placate members after signing agreements which they cannot afford, and as such he 
questions the logic and rationale of these unaffordable “deals”.  He goes on to say 
that the exemption system, much vaunted by Government, does not work.325  The 
reason, according to Papenfus, is that an applicant has to be under severe financial 
strain to be met with any type of consideration and, then with the slow turnaround 
time from the council, the applicant has gone out of business by the time it receives a 
response.  To add salt to the wounds, approximately half the time the application is 
denied in any event.326 
 
The solution for Papenfus is for the Government to change the law such that small 
businesses are given a bigger voice and are consequently freed from domination by 
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the bigger players.327  As already documented above, the amendments to the Labour 
Relations Act, as they pertain to section 32, are aimed at strengthening the 
exemption process.  The intention is also to promote impartiality in the appeal 
process and give the applicants a greater opportunity to be heard. 
 
With regard to the turnaround time it must be noted that section 23 of the MEIBC 
main agreement deals with exemptions, and that sub-section 23(3) deals specifically 
with matters of urgency. 328   It provides for a procedure whereby the Council 
chairperson and vice-chairperson may consider and decide on applications which are 
accompanied by a substantive explanation as to the nature of the urgency.329  It must 
be noted that no specific time frames are included in the section, and that the 
requirement to communicate decisions “without delay” is also less than specific. 
 
The question of differing views on the actual success rate of exemption applications 
should theoretically be answered through the vehicle that is section 54(2)(f) of the 
LRA.  This section was introduced via the 2002 amendments and requires that 
bargaining councils provide details regarding small businesses within their sector. It 
also requires information relating to the success rate of exemption applications from 
small businesses.  The section 54(2)(f) documentation of the MEIBC indicates an 
overall exemption success rate of 90% per cent.  A comparison of party success rate 
versus non-party success rate favours party employers at 92.8 per cent as opposed 
to non-party employers at 83.4%.  One cannot argue, on either measure, that these 
figures do not reflect a system receptive to the economic realities and claims of the 
applicants.   
 
A significant statistic that emerges from an analysis of the MEIBC data is the 
relatively low percentage of applications received from small non-party employers.  If 
one had to use the employee-strength details contained in the MEIBC answering 
affidavit330 and relate this to the MEIBC 54(2) data, then only 2.6% of non-party 
employers employing fewer than 10 employees submitted exemption applications 
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and only 0.58 % of small non-party employers in this category applied and were 
refused exemption.  This is a significant statistic given the argument that it is 
particularly smaller employers who bear the economic brunt of bargaining-council 
agreement extensions.  Whilst still reasonably low, the percentage of small-party 
employers who submitted applications was significantly higher at 14.4 per cent.  It is 
possible that this reflects the assistance that is available to party employers from 
their employer organisations. 
 
The MEIBC points to the existence of the Independent Exemptions Appeal Board as 
further evidence of a fair and equitable exemption system.  The Board’s 
independence is emphasized and it is noted that the current Board consists of a 
senior attorney, a senior CCMA commissioner and a chartered accountant. 331  
Transparency is also highlighted in that decisions are made available to parties on 
request332 and the board hearings are open to the public.333  The MEIBC notes the 
success rate suggesting that the majority of appeals are upheld. A table depicting the 
outcome record of appeals from March 2011 to August 2013 (30 months) indicates 
that 151 appeals were granted by the board and 98 were declined during the same 
period.334  This statistic does certainly dispel any possible notion that the Appeal 
Board is merely rubber-stamping Council decisions. 
 
6.2.2.2  ACCESS TO THE COURTS 
 
The MEIBC makes the point that any party that is dissatisfied by a Council decision 
has access to the Labour Court as a vehicle to challenge the decision.335  Whilst 
recording that there is no evidence of undercutting or collusion in the industry, the 
MEIBC notes further that actions in the courts could potentially be brought under 
existing competition laws as well. 
 
It is noteworthy that there have been only five challenges against decisions of the 
independent exemptions board at the time of submitting the answering affidavit.  
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Possibly even more significant is that all five of these matters are still pending.336  
This statistics certainly do not suggest a quick and easy access to justice. 
 
6.2.2.3 INCLUSION OF SMALL BUSINESS 
 
Regarding the representation of small business on the Council the MEIBC argues 
that there is no requirement to allocate a specific seat on the Council for small 
business as contemplated in terms of section 30(1)(b) of the LRA.  This is because of 
the wide spread in size across the membership of the existing employer Associations 
party to the Council.337  In an arbitration held in 2011 between NEASA and the 
MEIBC pertaining to the Council constitution an agreement was reached regarding 
the allocation of seats on the Council. 338   It is alleged by the MEIBC that 
notwithstanding the fact that SEIFSA affiliated employers are in the majority, NEASA 
was allocated more seats on the Council.339  It does appear, however, that despite 
the agreement this matter has continued to be a bone of contention between the two 
employer organisations.340 
 
The MEIBC, when explaining the process followed before concluding their 
agreements point out that non-parties are not totally excluded from the process.  The 
inclusivity comes in the form of an invitation to all non-party employers, prior to the 
onset of negotiations, to submit proposals for discussion.341 
 
6.2.2.4 THE IMPACT ON UNEMPLOYMENT 
 
The MEIBC relies on research by Godfrey to counter the FMF arguments pertaining 
to the negative impact of council agreements on employment levels.  Reference is 
made in Godfrey to research by Driffil and Calmfors which concludes that the 
decentralisation of bargaining does not reduce unemployment.342  It is also noted that 
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there are numerous economic variables that impact on unemployment levels at any 
point in time.  These include other labour-market factors such as the quality of 
relations between employers and employees.343 
 
Regarding the impact of bargaining councils on jobs in the industry, the MEIBC 
points to the Industry Policy Forum (IPF) as a vehicle that has been instituted to 
address this issue amongst others.  The role of the IPF is also to develop trade and 
industrial policy, skills development, housing, pensions and bursaries.344 
 
6.2.3 THE SECOND FRONT 
6.2.3.1 THE DEMOCRATIC FOUNDATION AND ACHIEVING THE OBJECTIVES 
OF THE LRA 
 
The MEIBC suggests that industrial-relations systems are both polycentric and 
institutional in nature. 345   As such they are essentially a political animal best 
developed through the legislative forums.  The Council points to the evolution of 
labour law over an extended period to support the fact that the legislature is better 
equipped than the courts in this regard. 
 
The MEIBC argues that the collective-bargaining system has been the foundation of 
the country’s industrial-relations system.  As such any significant disruption to this 
foundation will have destabilising effects that will spill out beyond the system itself.  
The MEIBC suggests that the FMF challenge would appear to offend the 
constitutional right to bargain collectively and as such should be approached with due 
caution.346  The MEIBC contends further that the extension of collective agreements 
in terms of section 32 is the key factor holding the system in place.  The Council 
predicts that in the absence of the extension provision councils will collapse in the 
medium term.347 
 
                                                          
343 Answering affidavit of the 20th respondent: the MEIBC par 193. 
344 Answering affidavit of the 20th respondent: the MEIBC par 127. 
345 Answering affidavit of the 20th respondent: the MEIBC par 15 – 16. 
346 Answering affidavit of the 20th respondent: the MEIBC par 17. 
347 Answering affidavit of the 20th respondent: the MEIBC par 18. 
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The point is made that the basic arguments of the FMF are far from novel, having 
been considered almost continuously throughout the evolution of the council system.  
Whilst this evolutionary process might have lacked legitimacy in apartheid South 
Africa this has been far from the case post 1994.  The dawn of the new political 
dispensation saw the birth of National Economic Development and Labour Council 
(NEDLAC), which replaced the former National Manpower Commission.  The 
legitimacy of NEDLAC lies in its representative nature comprising organised 
business, organised labour, communities and the State.  It is this representative body 
which considers all proposed labour legislation before it gets to Parliament.  Very 
importantly this included all discussion pertaining to the development of the new 
post-apartheid Labour Relations Act. 
 
It is this characteristic of vigorous debate between the negotiating partners at 
NEDLAC which, according to the MEIBC produced a statute of great legitimacy.348  
The Council, in their answering affidavit, quote Dhaya Pillay in this regard: 
 
“Then came freedom and with it the 1993 Constitution and its 1996 successor. The 
people participated in the process of drafting and adopting our Constitution in a way 
that is said to have been unprecedented internationally. On the labour front the 
National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC) was established to 
provide a structure for the engagement of the social partners in the process of 
passing labour laws so as to deepen our democracy. Participation has been about 
as good as government of the people by the people can get. Everyone who wanted 
to have a say in the drafting of the Constitution and labour laws could have had a 
say. The possibility of particular interests or issues being omitted has thereby been 
minimised.” 
 
It is also noteworthy that section 32 of the LRA has been the subject of extensive 
debate over the years by virtue of the fact that it has been amended in every single 
amendment to the LRA since the inception of the Act.349  This debate occurred within 
the walls of NEDLAC and the amendments in 2002 were preceded by negotiations 
within the Millenium Labour Council.350  The Council had in fact published its vision 
just the year before and it included this statement pertaining to Bargaining Councils: 
 
                                                          
348 Answering affidavit of the 20threspondent: The MEIBC par 59. 
349 The amendments to the LRA were implemented in 1996, 1998 and 2002 and on each occasion 
s 32 was the subject of an amendment. 
350 The Millenium Labour Council is an extra-statutory body comprising organised labour and 
business. 
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“The Parties acknowledge that Bargaining Councils are an integral part of the 
collective bargaining arrangements in South Africa, and the need to strengthen their 
function. One feature is the number of non-parties to the Council. The Parties agree 
that it would be desirable to promote membership by small business of employer’s 
associations so that their interests may be represented more effectively in 
bargaining councils where such bargaining councils have jurisdiction. Membership 
of such employer associations would be voluntary.”351 
 
The MEIBC recorded the positions of the key stakeholders at the time the new LRA 
was debated in NEDLAC. Of specific relevance is the fact that Business South Africa 
argued strongly for the retention of the ‘principals’ underlying the industrial council 
system. 352   This included a qualified support for the extension of council 
agreements.353 
 
6.2.3.2 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATION WOULD BE JUSTIFIED 
 
Whilst vehemently denying that any constitutional right is being violated by section 32 
extensions, the MEIBC nevertheless argues in their answering affidavit that any 
limitation would in any event be justifiable.  In this regard the Council leans on the 
writings of Brassey in Employment Law.354  Brassey sets out the case for justification 
relying principally on the safeguards that have been incorporated by the drafters of 
the LRA. 
 
The first safeguard lies is the facility for objections against the establishment of 
bargaining councils in the first place.  Also at the genesis phase is the requirement 
that NEDLAC approves both scope and jurisdiction.  Small business interests have to 
be adequately represented and then there are the various hurdles that need to be 
crossed prior to a legal-agreement extension.355  The requirements for an exemption 
process and independent appeals stand as the final bulwark in the defence of 
legitimacy.  All these factors, according to Brassey, would at the very least justify a 
successful claim for the limitations clause.356 
 
                                                          
351 Answering affidavit of the 20threspondent: the MEIBC par 41. 
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6.2.4 THE THIRD FRONT 
6.2.4.1 BARGAINING COUNCILS: THE BASTION OF SECTORAL BARGAINING 
 
The MEIBC has a collective bargaining levy that is applicable to party and non-party 
employers alike.  This levy is constituted in terms of the agency-shop provisions of 
the LRA.357  The Council argues that, if this agreement were not extended to non-
parties, the consequent under-funding would hamstring the Council’s ability to 
effectively engage in collective bargaining.  This in turn would negate their capacity to 
function effectively and would retard the benefits that flow to the Industry.  Whether 
there is in fact a net benefit attributable to bargaining councils is of course up for 
debate in this dissertation.  
 
6.2.4.2 THE COUNCIL BENEFITS 
 
The MEIBC argues that the extension of their social security-related agreements 
serve to enforce practices that ultimately relieve the social-security burden of the 
State.  These agreements include the Council’s pension, provident fund and sick-pay 
agreements.358  The Council notes that in the event that the pension and provident-
funds agreements were not extended to the industry then 145 630 employees in the 
industry would be under no obligation to provide for their retirement.359 
 
The MEIBC argues further that the absence of non-parties within these funds could 
prejudice their financial liability.360  The extension of agreements increases the scope 
of employees who have access to social benefits which they would otherwise be 
unable to afford.  It also ensures a decent wage for all employees within bargaining-
council jurisdiction which assists with the upliftment of their families.361 
 
The MEIBC makes further claims of a more specific nature that would follow in the 
event that bargaining-council agreements were not extended.  Such claims include a 
public safety risk in the event that non-parties in the Lift Engineering sector had no 
                                                          
357 In terms of s 25 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
358 Answering affidavit of the 20th respondent: the MEIBC par 129.6. 
359 Ibid. 
360 Ibid. 
361 Answering affidavit of the 20th respondent: the MEIBC par 233.5. 
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obligation to comply with the agreement.362  This is because of the specialised nature 
of this sector.  The MEIBC also makes reference to its own statutory responsibilities 
in terms of dispute resolution, arguing that the underfunding that would result in the 
event of non-extension would transfer this responsibility to an already overburdened 
CCMA.363 
 
6.2.4.3 BARGAINING COUNCILS ARE NOT PRIVATE ACTORS 
 
The MEIBC makes the point that Councils are statutory bodies and as such they are 
responsible and accountable.  Their decisions can be reviewed in terms of both the 
LRA and PAJA.364 
 
6.2.2.4 THE REAL OBJECTIVE OF THE FMF 
 
At the time of that the South African Foundation produced their macro-economic 
policy in 1996 the labour caucus at NEDLAC produced a responding document 
entitled “Social Equity and Job Creation”.  In this document the caucus accused the 
SAF document of being nothing more than a “well-financed and well-publicised 
campaign” for the business community to “cling onto their wealth”.365 
 
The MEIBC suggests in their responding papers that the FMF has a similar objective 
in that it is representing business interests seeking to maximise profits under the 
guise of a job-creation agenda.  It is argued that the ultimate objective of the FMF 
application is to render the council system unworkable for this purpose.366  This 
would pave the way to a return to a free-market system where employers, as a 
consequence of their relative strength, would be in a position to enforce low 
wages.367 
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The MEIBC has recorded the fact that NEASA have the same objective to collapse 
the bargaining council. In an open letter to NEASA, dated 14 August 2014,368 the 
council quotes an extract from NEASA correspondence to SEIFSA in July 2014 as 
follows: 
 
“There is only one way to get out of this mess and the stronghold NUMSA has on 
this Council and the South African economy: NEASA, SEIFSA and all other 
organisations have to withdraw from this council. For NEASA to do this, without the 
SEIFSA affiliated organisations doing the same, will serve no purpose. At least both 
of our organisations will have to withdraw. I hereby request you to seriously consider 
your position in this regard. The MEIBC stands in the way of everything that is 
important in this industry. It might serve the interests of a particular employer or 
group of employers and of cause radical trade unions, and especially those with a 
socialist agenda, but not the interests of employers and the Industry as a whole, and 
therefore not the interests of South Africa as a whole.” 
 
The MEIBC alleges further that NEASA appears to have adopted a strategy to attack 
the validity of council structures on any technical issue, notwithstanding the merits.369 
  
                                                          
368 Accessed from the MEIBC website on 9 September 2014. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
The history of collective bargaining demonstrates the extent of its socio-political 
context.  Political undercurrents, including the 1922 and 1973 strikes, as well as the 
onset and demise of apartheid, have all played their role in shaping the development 
of collective bargaining in South Africa.  Global influences have become increasingly 
relevant over time in the midst of dissipating economic boundaries.  The socio-
political context in 2014 is the most tumultuous in post-apartheid history.  A six-month 
strike in the Platinum industry, employer lock-outs in the engineering industry, a 
parliamentary face lift and NUMSA’s expulsion from COSATU are all testament to a 
multi-faceted attack on the status quo.  The Freemarket Foundation application is no 
different in this respect. 
 
The Platinum strike in the first half of the year was the longest strike in South African 
history and served to secure a 20% increase on wages.  This is at a time when the 
average inflation rate as at the end of August 2014 has been 6.33%.370  It was also a 
good example of the political influence in the collective-bargaining process, in this 
case underpinned by a battle for supremacy between trade unions AMCU and NUM. 
 
It has been widely suggested that political motives influenced the 2014 strike in the 
Metal and Engineering sector, headed by trade union NUMSA. Gerhard Papenfus, 
CEO of the National Employers Association of South Africa, attributed the strike to 
NUMSA’S militant socialist agenda.371  This was in the wake of NUMSA’s uneasy 
relationship and threatened split from COSATU (which has since eventuated). 
NEASA in turn have been the subject of accusations as to the political nature of their 
agenda.  NUMSA engineering-sector bargaining co-ordinator, Steven Nhlapo, is 
                                                          
370 http://www.inflation.eu/inflation-rates/south-africa/historic-inflation/cpi-inflation-south-africa-
2014.aspx accessed on 2 October 2014. 
371 Quoted on Five FM radio news on Monday 14 July 2014 during the period of the strike in the 
Metal and Engineering Industry sector. 
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quoted as saying that NEASA is “playing dirty political games” as a means to 
increase membership and revenues.372  This was in reference to NEASA’s interdict 
application against the extension of the agreement in that sector.  There is no doubt 
that both the FMF and NEASA challenges have the potential to overhaul the 
collective-bargaining landscape in our Country.  This much is acknowledged by 
COSATU.  
 
The current instability in not surprising if one considers the mounting disillusion with 
political leadership as well as global economic upheaval over the last six years.  If 
one looks abroad it is clear that South Africa does not stand alone in re-evaluating 
the merits of extended collective agreements.  There has been a firm change in 
stance towards the extension of agreements in Europe as a consequence of 
countries becoming indebted following the financial crises in 2008.  
 
The response has been to take measures to restrict the extension of collective 
agreements.373  These formed part of their required austerity measures which have 
been founded on an assumption that reducing wages is the key to regaining 
competitiveness.374  Greece suspended the extension of collective agreements as 
well as the favourability clause, with the consequence that firm-level agreements now 
trump sector-level agreements.375  The impact has been that since 2012 eighty per 
cent of firm-level agreements have introduced wage cuts.  This was not an unusual 
phenomenon in Europe, given that more than half of member countries have 
experienced decreased real compensation over the period from 2010 to 2014.376  
The Greek Government went further by removing the right of industry players to 
determine the national minimum wage.377 
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In Portugal restrictions were placed on the ability to extend collective agreements 
with a 50% threshold requirement introduced.378  Only twelve collective agreements 
were extended in Portugal in 2012 as opposed to a figure of one hundred and thirty-
seven in 2008.  The number of employees covered by the extensions reduced from 
1,9 million to only 328 thousand.379  Likewise in neighbour Spain the number of 
employees covered by collective agreements reduced from 11,6 million in 2007 to 
4,6 million in 2013.380 
 
The Irish National pay-bargaining system broke down in 2009, with the result that 
most collective bargaining occurs at plant level.  The Irish Government also placed 
restrictions on the determination of minimum wages in certain sectors.381 
 
It is important to note in the context of this treatise that these amendments were 
initiated on a political level and were not the function of a court judgment.  There is 
perhaps merit in the MEIBC’s contention that the courts are not the best forum to 
address this challenge.  This is especially so, given that the FMF elected to refer the 
matter to the High Court rather than the Labour Court.   
 
The prospects of legal success for the FMF are in my opinion limited given the 
legitimate political foundation of the current system, and in the absence of any 
obvious technical constitutional violation that could not in the least be defended in 
terms of the limitation clause.  The fact that bargaining councils are subject to judicial 
review in terms of PAJA does weaken the “private actors” argument.  It would also be 
hard to argue against the efficacy of the exemption system if the exemption statistics 
provided by the MEIBC were to be accepted as fact.  One must also consider that the  
latest amendments to section 32 should ensure greater efficiency in the 
administration of exemption applications and greater impartiality amongst decision 
makers at the appeal level. It is also a commonly accepted fact that extending 
agreements in terms of section 32 is the glue that holds the (current) system 
together.  The system will collapse in its absence and undermine the entire collective 
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bargaining framework as it exists.  This could potentially impinge on everyone’s 
constitutional right to collective bargaining. 
 
It is possible that the strategy behind the FMF application is simply to engender 
political debate on the issue and that victory in the Constitutional Court is not the 
ultimate prize.  Even if this is not the conscious strategy, the application has been 
successful in raising the profile of the debate.  It is certainly an important and relevant 
debate – the European response proves this.  The FMF application must not be 
underestimated in terms of the value it adds to the debate.   
 
The existence of collusion between Capital and Labour cannot be dismissed out of 
hand. Neither party can lay claim to a completely altruistic past.  The exclusivity of 
the initial artisan-based unions is an example of self-interest which phenomenon is 
also very much central to the historic philosophy of capitalism.  It is therefore not 
inconceivable that this self-interest may morph into mutual interest when the 
opportunity arises.  It is fair to suggest that this opportunity does arise within the 
framework of institutionalised collective bargaining and that it can be executed to the 
detriment of society at large. 
 
A shift away from highly centralised collective bargaining is not out of touch with 
wider social trends.  A similar theme is evident in the push towards consuming local 
products as environmental awareness gathers momentum around the globe. In the 
political arena, the move towards independence and sovereignty has been ongoing 
since midway through the twentieth century.  The status quo continues to be 
challenged on an ever increasing scale with greater access to information. 
 
It is my opinion that the FMF’s argument for employer representivity warrants 
attention.  There is no doubt that the current employee-strength criteria favour large 
employers and possibly international corporate capital over local private capital.  
Understandably there may be a concern that employer-representivity criteria may 
provide the opportunity for a strategic exodus of small employers from employer 
organisations in an attempt to undermine council representivity.  
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This concern, and indeed the whole question of agreement extension, could become 
redundant in the instance of a total overhaul of the current system.  Perhaps the 
concept of a voluntary central bargaining system is not that unrealistic.  It would, 
however, require that measures are put in place to promote plant-level bargaining as 
a viable and available alternative.  A mandatory agency-fee system payable by 
employer and employees alike at non-party firms could be channelled towards 
resourcing the increased manpower that would be required to engineer a shift 
towards greater plant-level bargaining.   
 
This level of bargaining should theoretically produce agreements that reflect the 
economic realities of the negotiating parties more accurately.  It would also negate 
the requirement for an exemption system because flexibility would be available in the 
first instance.  A further spin-off would be the opportunity and freedom to craft 
customised agreements that factor in productivity measures that impact positively on 
national economic competitiveness.  The current system is geared towards 
eliminating competition on wages but does little to encourage out of the ordinary 
performance within the bargaining unit. In a sense then it continues to uphold a 
management/labour divide which in a South African context has particularly negative 
social consequences.   
 
Institutionalised collective bargaining has proved over time to be an enduring and 
valued element of socio-political frameworks across the globe.  This value has been 
created, particularly in more recent times, in South Africa, by virtue of it being the 
product of legitimate democratic processes.  As such it is improbable that a court of 
law would see fit to collapse the system in its entirety.  What is clear, however, is that 
the system does not enjoy universal support and is coming under immense pressure.  
The social stakes are high and for that reason it is my opinion that any potential 
adaptation to the system should ideally flow out of the legislative process. 
  
72 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 
 
BOOKS 
 
Bean, R Comparative Industrial Relations: An Introduction to Cross-national 
Perspectives (1985) New York, St Martins Press  
 
Boeri, T; Brugiavini, A and Calmfors, L (eds) The Role of Unions in the 21st Century 
(2001) Oxford Scholarship on-line 
 
Du Toit, D; Godfrey, S; Goldberg, M; Maree, J and Theron, J Protecting Workers or 
Stifling Enterprise?  Industrial Councils and Small Business (1995) 
 
Finnemore, M Introduction to Industrial Relations 6th edition (2002) Lexis Nexis 
Durban 
 
Godfrey, S; Maree, J; Du Toit, D and Theron, J Collective Bargaining in South Africa 
(2010) Juta & Company  
 
Grogan, J Collective Labour Law (2007) Juta & Company  
 
Jones, R Collective Bargaining in South Africa (1985) 2nd edition  
 
Nel, P South African Employment Relations: Theory and Practice (2002) 4th edition 
Van Schaik 
 
Van der Walt, A; Le Roux, R and Govindjee, A Labour Law in Context (2012) 
Pearson Education South Africa 
 
Watson, T Sociology, Work and Organisation (2011) 6th edition 
 
Webster, E Cast in a Racial Mould: Labour Process and Trade Unionism in the 
Foundries (1985) Ravan Press Johannesburg 
 
 
  
73 
ARTICLES 
 
Barron, C Big Business does the dirty on smaller rivals Sunday Times 20 July 2014 
 
Bruun, N The autonomy of collective agreement  
 
Isa, M Gloom for growing army of job seekers Business Times 3 August 2014  
 
Marais, J David vs Goliath battle in metal sector Business Times 3 August 2014  
 
Steyn, G Red Tape Strangling Job Creation Finance week of 2 February 2005  
 
 
JOURNALS 
 
Donnelly “Borrowing from Europe? Employers views on Associability and collective 
bargaining reform in the New South Africa” 12:4 June 2001 International Journal of 
Human Resource Management  551 – 567 
 
 
ACADEMIC PAPERS 
 
Godfrey Why do Employers Bargain at Particular Levels? A Longitudinal Study of 
Western Cape Clothing Employer’s Perceptions and Behaviour with Regard to Levels 
of Collective Bargaining 1991 – 1995 (unpublished Masters dissertation, University of 
Cape Town 1997) 
 
 
INTERVIEWS WITH THE AUTHOR 
 
Trentini, L Operations Director, SEIFSA 9 September 2014 
 
  
74 
TABLE OF CASES 
 
Delisle v Canada (Deputy Attorney General) [1999] 2 SCR 989  
 
Freemarket Foundation and Minister of Labour, Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development case no. 13762/13 
 
Kem-Lin Fashions v Brunton& Another (2001) 22 ILJ 109 (LAC) 
 
Mawu v Hart (1985) 6 ILJ 478 (IC) 
 
  
75 
WEBSITES 
 
http://www.humancapitalreview.org/content/default.asp?Article_ID=1026 
 
http://www.freemarketfoundation.com/issues/minister-finally-responds-but-fails-to-
understand-grounds-for-the-fmfs-legal-challenge-to-labour-act 
 
http://mg.co.za/article/2013-03-08-00-bargaining-extension-fought-on-constitutional-
grounds-1 
 
www.freemarketfoundation.com 
 
http://www.neasa.co.za/Press-Room/Press-Releases/The-Labour-Minister-Turns-
Against-SMME-s.aspx. 
 
http://www.humancapitalreview.org/content/default.asp?Article_ID=1026 
 
http://www.meibc.co.za/index.php/about/meibc-background-and-context. 
 
http://www.inflation.eu/inflation-rates/south-africa/historic-inflation/cpi-inflation-south-
africa-2014.aspx 
 
http://www.politicsweb.co.za/politicsweb/view/politicsweb/en/page71654?oid=737229
&sn= Detail&pid=71654 
 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/empl/dv/presentatio
n_schulten _/presentation_schulten_en.pdf 
 
 
LEGAL DOCUMENTS 
 
Freemarket Foundation Notice of motion of case number 13762/13 before the 
Gauteng North High Court 
 
MEIBC Answering affidavit in case no. 13762/13 before the Gauteng North High 
Court 
 
  
76 
TABLE OF STATUTES 
 
Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997 
 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 200of 1993 
 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 108 of 1996 
 
Industrial Conciliation Act 11 of 1924 
 
Industrial Conciliation Act 36 of 1937 
 
Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 
 
Labour Relations Amendment Bill of 2013 
 
